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Abstract 
 
UK government considered the referendum as a one-way street (exit EU or not) after the 
changes in the political and economic status of Europe. The direct impact of such an event must 
be characterized as a shock, not only to the EU society, but on a worldwide level as well. In 
the aftermath of the approval vote to leave EU, nothing more than an uncertain environment 
has been left. This paper examines the effect of that political event in the economic world and 
more specific on asset prices of the 28 countries of Europe. Therefore, the purpose of this paper 
is to investigate the impact of such an event, in the stock market in terms of abnormal returns. 
The impact of Brexit in the world economy in the long run must considered as impossible to 
measure reliably, thus, a short-run event study is more suitable in this case. Methodology 
concerns the European Union the period of 260 days before the announcement of the 
referendum (24/06/2016) until 10 days after. From the results, we conduct some key 
comparisons and measurements (EU Less PIIGS, PIIGS, Non-Eurozone, Eurozone, EU Less 
UK) after we put in order the countries, according to the level of influence from the referendum 
and the end we examine other smaller economic unions. These national and international events 
are highly affect the stock markets, due to the rise of trade volume worldwide and react 
accordingly. During such political and economic uncertainty, there is a large amount of public 
and inside information exchanges, which is the perfect opportunity for testing the validity of 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). As there are significant Abnormal Returns, it is easy 
to conclude that the stock prices don’t react quickly and efficiently to the new information or 
event without bias.  
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2 INTRODUCTION 
The “separation” of a country from a strong union is not something that happens usually in the 
global economic world. However, the impact of that kind of event is considered to be severe. 
The recent event of the decision, in the form of a referendum, of the United Kingdom leaving 
the European Union, known as BREXIT (British EXIT), although unexpected and possibly bad 
for the economies, creating uncertainty, of both the EU and the UK, raises a lot of questions 
and gives way for interesting research topics. Taking this opportunity, we shall try to answer 
some of them, focusing mainly on the immediate impact of the United Kingdom’s referendum 
outcome to each and every one of the European Union’s national market indices (including the 
United Kingdom) in the form of residual analysis (event study) and identify how much, if any, 
were the price drop in every national market index price. Focusing in the European Union, we 
observe the direct relations between countries of the Union and the dependence of each country 
separately and in specialized groups of countries. With that event study, we can conclude not 
only how much United Kingdom affected the rest of European Union in terms of percentage 
but also the reasons of that changes. 
2.1 MAIN PURPOSE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The importance of that paper is great, due to the fact that a well specified and well establish 
measurement in the short-term environment has the ability to generate valuable information 
that can influence the policies and choices of households, cities, industries and even the 
monetary policy of countries (Antulio N. Bomfim, 2003). That kind of information can be 
translated in the stock market and the informational efficiency of each market separately. It is 
a great example and opportunity to measure the level of efficiency according to the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis(EMH) as summarized by Fama (1970 & 1976). Does the media play a 
significant role on the results of such an event and what happened before the crucial date of the 
announcement of the results [(C. Justin Robinson & Prosper Bangwayo-Skeete, 2017), (Sofia 
Vasilopoulou, 2016)]? One other characteristic of the upcoming results is that the uncertainty 
reaches global high after the event, and drove economic policies to be tighter (Davis, 2016). 
That kind of uncertainty has a valid influence in the financial markets and what is the relation 
with the political uncertainty (Lee A. Smales, 2016). Moreover, the affect in the banking sector 
separately is crucial and useful, to measure and purpose ideas about the drop down of the stock 
markets, and how they react (Miyajima, H., Yafeh, Y. ,2007), (Van Dijk, M.A., 2011).  
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And at the end of the day, who was worst off? 
Our goal is to answer the above question as accurately as possible. In order to achieve that we 
conducted a series of Hypothesis’, that were the results of the above-mentioned papers. So, in 
that way we have a clearer view, not only for the results, but also for the procedure of our 
methodology. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Brexit’s vote was bad news for the European Union in short term period 
Here we expect not to reject this, as there is no sign of any paper which indicates an upward 
trend in the stock market when there is uncertainty. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a semi strong-form efficient market hypothesis. 
There is not Insider/Private Information regarding the referendum 
There are evidences on the papers that we have analyzed above, that most of the stock markets, 
in the 20th century, follow the semi-strong form efficiency. 
 
Hypothesis 3: U.K. affected more than any other European country 
Since the U.K. is the country that the event got real, will be also the country that affected the 
most. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Euro protects the countries of its use 
Euro as currency, was created in the first place as a mean to increase the trade among the 
members, strengthening and protecting their values in times of uncertainty. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The level of influence was affected according to the level of debt of each country 
As the economic crisis of Europe during the last decade, is a demand and debt crisis, we expect 
that the results will be influenced the most, by the size of the debt of each country according to 
its GDP. 
 
Limitations:  
We were occupied with the stock markets of the European Union and not of all around the 
globe. 
The time of the event, there is the assumption that the only significant event that influence the 
stock markets is the one that we research for. 
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We focus on European Union and the regional unions inside of it, as well as every single 
country separately, and in the end, we team them up according to some certain characteristics.  
Our purpose is the contribution of the results of our hypothesis, together with comparative 
tables that can be used as a reference, or even as a starting point, for future researches, 
indicating, in an orderly manner and fashion, the national indices that were, from the least to 
the most, worse off due to the outcome of this referendum, if significant. This will assist us, 
and any other researcher, to find out the actual quantitative impact of the UK’s referendum 
outcome to every of the EU’s national stock markets (28 countries, including UK). Of course, 
this shall, also, create room for further research e.g. on other countries and industries, as well 
as, research on the next stages of the Brexit journey and event studies as a whole. 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF THE PAPER 
So, in the next chapter, one may find the literature review of this work that enabled us to 
develop this research, the authors of which, we would like to thank and give credits to. In the 
literature review, we start from a broader perspective and we end up specific in the referendum 
for the Brexit of 2016. In the first place we analyze the Efficient Market Hypothesis and how 
that impact the scientific world and the need of “event studies created”. In upcoming chapter, 
there are the data utilized in the methodology, and in the fifth chapter exists the methodology 
presentation itself and why we used that specific procedure. The seventh chapter is consisted 
of the results, some of which unexpected, trying to reject or not reject the initial hypothesis, 
and how the individual results of each country makes us proceed with further investigation that 
is customized by the results themselves. In the eighth chapter you can find our closing thoughts, 
discussion, conclusions and what is the room left for further research. Last, but not least, as 
one may be interested, in the ninth and tenth chapters, can be found the references, appendix 
and the detailed tables of our calculations. 
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON EVENT STUDIES 
 
Historical Prices are not affected by their past. This is the main assumption of the random-walk 
theory, in order to declare that there is no trend that can be found, so you can predict the 
upcoming price of a security. The Efficient Market Hypothesis EMH theory does the same 
assumption, so the future prices are random. 
[(Alexander (1961), Fama, (1965), Ball and Brown (1968), Jensen and Benington, (1970), 
Fama, (1970), Charest and Jarrell (1978), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Collins and Dent 
(1984), DeBondt and Thaler (1985), Brickley and Netter (1988), Corrado (1989), Rosenstein 
and Wyatt (1990), Chopra et al. (1992), Seppi (1992), Elton et al. (1993), Malkiel (1995), 
Kothari and Warner (1997), MacKinlay (1997), Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997)] 
- 
"The efficient market hypothesis is associated with the idea of a "random walk," which is a 
term loosely used in the nuance literature to characterize a price series where all subsequent 
price changes represent random departures from previous prices. The logic of the random walk 
idea is that if the ow of information is unimpeded and information is immediately reflected in 
stock prices, then tomorrow's price change will reflect only tomorrow's news and will be 
independent of the price changes today." [Malkiel (2003), p. 59.] 
- 
The information that we can absorb from the previous sentences are absolutely important for 
the market as a whole, how it reacts into new information or an event, as Efficient Market 
Hypothesis express that the price of securities reflect all the information that is available to the 
market about the specific security (Fama, 1970). As a result, all the information, public or 
private, microeconomic or macroeconomic, has an impact on the price. The adjustment of the 
price to the new information, such as splits, deaths of a CEOs, merges and acquisition, issuance 
of bonds, issuance of new shares, new major stakeholders, shocks, balance sheet 
announcements, dividends, rise of earnings, investments, terror attacks, change of political 
parties, change of currency, banks failures, referendums, is immediate. With that in mind, stock 
returns follow a random walk as we have analyzed above, so it is impossible to beat the market 
and outperform it, by finding or creating a pattern with historical prices. That is why this subject 
occupied not only professors and fundamental analysts but technical analysts in order to prove 
 10 | P a g e  
 
them wrong. Either way, Fama himself wasn’t absolute that the market is efficient. He started 
to build a theory around the previous one, and separate market into three forms depending on 
the information that is reflected to the prices of stocks. That three are the weak, the semi-strong 
and the strong. Heston and Sigha (2016) did a great research about the previous subject and 
the reaction of news in stock prices and they conclude that the good stories have positive effects 
to the daily prices of stocks and vice versa.  
It is easy to identify that there is a need in the scientific environment to create a way to measure 
reliably those effects in the security prices of stocks, not only in the short term, but for the long 
run as well. So, the concept of the event study created, and it is used until today as an analytical 
tool in finance with a sufficient statistical technique for analyzing all kind of information we 
pointed out previously. The first one who touched the subject was James Dolley (1993) by 
measuring the effect in stock prices of stock splits and if there any pattern, after him Archie 
Bakay (1948) and John Ashley (1962) followed. 
Relating to event studies themselves, to structure our research, as correctly as possible, we took 
under consideration the methodology and the advancements of the event study procedure, as 
developed through time. We could not exclude the initial endeavor of Fama, Fisher, Jensen, 
and Roll (FFJR) and their pioneer work (1969). This work, although interested in the splits, 
dividends, and new information, had set the foundations for the modern event study 
methodology. From there onwards many papers tried to identify this kind of methodology, with 
the most successful and pivoting ones to be the works of Brown and Warner (1980, 1985, S. J. 
Brown, J. B. Warner) which identified the issues and propositions, by analyzing the 
specification and power of several modifications of the FFJR approach, for conducting an event 
study on monthly and daily data (issues of non-normality, non-synchronous trading and market 
model parameter estimation, and variance estimation), that assisted us with our own issues as 
we are interest in the latter ones (daily data). Notable, also, is the work of Bowman (1983) who 
tried really early to give an interpretation on that new, for that time, methodological approach 
to market based empirical research in finance and accounting of residual analysis (event study 
methodology). He managed to differ himself from the previous authors as he categorized event 
studies into four basic types: 
1) Information content (Ball and Brown) 
2) Market efficiency (FFJR) 
3) Model evaluation 
4) Metric explanation 
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It is clear, we have discussed already the first two. How about the other types? 
In the third type, Bowman tried to capture differential price effects, the magnitude of the excess 
return metric will be directly affected by the expectations model, and as a result, it allows us to 
evaluate alternative models for the expectations. This going to help with our hypothesis of 
private information or propaganda, as in empirical testing, the expectations model with 
imperfect expectations and that makes it interesting in the end of the day.  Interesting because 
every model and every reason is open of discussion and re-evaluation, due to asymmetry of 
information and agency problem. 
This kind of re-evaluation model is the last basic type of event studies, the metric explanation 
type. Its goal is to identify the variables which explain the impact in prices and indexes due to 
the information that is claimed from the event, the results of the referendum in the United 
Kingdom in our case, or test the market efficiency hypothesis. We conduct our own metric 
explanation, trying to find the significant reasons behind that movement of stock exchange for 
each country except of United Kingdom, which is affected from internal reasons that have 
already measured and calculated from previous papers in “The sectoral effects of Brexit on the 
British economy: early evidence from the reaction of the stock market “by Vikash Ramiah, Huy 
N. A. Pham & Imad Moosa (2016), and we are going to analyze in the chapters below. To 
compare the two last types, we quote Bowman himself: “Perhaps the easiest way to characterize 
the two types is to note that model evaluation entails an ex ante specification of models of 
expected security price reaction. Metric explanation is an ex post attempt to explain (i.e., 
model) the observed return metrics.”  
After Bowman, maybe the most widely used paper is the one of MacKinlay (1997) whose 
methodology and step by step procedure is utilized by this current research, because he 
concludes that, in rational market, prices react to new information. One year after, Binder tried 
to create successfully a sum of every development in the event study methodology since then, 
with his marvelous work (1998, The Event Study Methodology since 1969, J. J. Binder), giving 
a great and quite detailed overview of event studies, especially for someone starting his or her 
research from scratch. 
He identifies from the first page the two major reasons that event studies are used widely for 
financial event and accounting issues:  
 
1) Test the null hypothesis that the market efficiently incorporates information (see Fama 
(1991) for a summary of this evidence)  
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2) Under the maintained hypothesis of market efficiency, at least with respect to publicly 
available information, to examine the impact of some event on the wealth of the firm’s security 
holders. 
 
He doesn’t act so innovative as we can observe, but he organizes all the previous studies and 
explaining them in a way that seems new and different. Moreover, in our case, very insightful 
were the works of Lamdin, Bartholdy, Olson, Peare, Aktas, de Bodit, and Cousin. By reviewing 
these papers, it helps us in three levels of ambiguous matters: 
 
1) We were reassured that the event study methodology is truly the best approach to go on 
(2001, D. J. Lamdin), as he is highlight the three concerns of an event study: the importance of 
finding true event periods, the use of cross sectional tests, and the use of other supporting 
evidence. We test every possible choice that we had, in order to find the perfect combination 
in every one of those, as it is clear in the calculations in appendix. 
 
2) how to approach thinly traded markets and by adopting less restrictive criteria (2005, J. 
Bartholdy, D. Olson, P. Peare), and  
 
3) understood how to proceed, if the situation arises of contamination in estimation period 
(2006, N. Aktas, E. de Bodit, J. G. Cousin), because unrelated events do affect the specification 
and the power of standard event-study methods. 
 
After we pointed out the most notable event studies of all time for our opinion, we are 
mentioning some key event studies that have different events (general elections, president re-
elections, terrorist attacks, etc.) and their affects in the attitude of the returns of stocks and 
bonds. Their purpose was to answer two major questions: 
 
1)Does the returns are more volatile the day of the event or the non-event days? 
2)Does good news to has a good impact to the stock market? 
 
Nordhaus (1975), MacRae (1977), Hibbs (1977), Cowart (1978), Allvine, O‟Neill (1980), 
Ploeg (1984), Huang (1985), Alesina and Sachs (1986), Maning (1989), Schwert (1989), 
Roberts (1990), Stovall (1992); Gemmil (1992),Gartner (1994), Gärtner and Wellershoff 
(1995), Hensel and Ziemba (1995), Kim and Mei (1999), Johnson et al. (1999), Herron et al. 
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(1999), Pantzalis et al. (2000), Drazen (2001), Mei & Guo (2002), Nishat, M. and Mustafa, K. 
(2002)Acemoglu, et al. (2003), Zach (2003), Ma, Sun and Tang (2003), Martínez and Santiso 
(2003), Guo (2003), Nicholas Chen (2004), Carter and Simkins (2004), Zhao et al. (2004), Lin 
& Wang (2005), Akysha and Shakil (2005), Leblang and Mukherjee (2005), Beaulieu et al. 
(2005), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Dopke and Pierdzioch (2006), Anoop Singh (2006); Li 
and Born (2006), Ling-Fang Liu (2007), Wing-Keung Wong and Michael McAleer (2007), 
Clark, Masood and Tunaru (2008), Beyer et al. (2008), Jones (2008), Ray M. & Nickles (2009), 
Ahmad (2009), Khalid, Ahmed et al. (2010), Abidin & Martin (2010), Kongprajya (2010), 
Bechtel and Füss (2010), Ling-Chun Hung (2011), Salameh & AlBash (2011), Aslam and Kong 
(2011), Suleman (2012), Leduc & Pammett (2013), Sturm (2013), Kabiru et al. (2015), Kumar 
Deva et al. (2015) 
 
The majority of these studies, identifies that political events creates greater uncertainty in the 
stock market, and as a result the markets are more sensitive to that kind of news, good or bad, 
national or international. That volatility in the security market is the perfect situation to 
investigate the Efficient Market Hypothesis. In our case, referendum in United Kingdom the 
23rd of June 2016 was a great opportunity. 
 
"According to the proponents of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, stock prices reflect all 
available information about companies and investors can't beat the market indexes by stock 
picking. They say investors trying to and a secret formula are wasting their time because stock 
prices follow a random walk. Interestingly, this theory also implies that a monkey selecting 
stocks by throwing darts at a newspaper's financial pages should perform as well as any star 
hedge fund manager who may or may not use inside information. You could guess how this 
was such a huge relief for millions of stock market investors. Suddenly, one need not worry 
about timing or stock picking skills. Since all the information is incorporated into stock prices, 
there's no need to do any research about the companies, or the macro economic developments, 
or the regulatory environment. Nothing, nada. Do you want to invest in an internet start-up that 
sells toys, with $30 million in revenue, $50 million in losses and $6 billion in market cap? 
Don't worry. Markets are efficient. Just buy it, as simple as that."  
(Warren Buffet, 2010) 
 
There are many other papers making use of the event study methodology as their empirical 
method of choice, from which we had gotten inspiration (e.g. Ritter), but we have chosen to 
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omit them and focus on the procedural or methodological papers on event studies rather than 
papers of how they were applied. 
3.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES FOR THE REFERENDUM OF “BREXIT” 
Since it is a recent event, most current articles have been majorly focused on the impact to 
volatility, due to this event, only to the major EU markets (2016, The Response of European 
Stock Markets to the Brexit, M. Raddant) and to the worldwide markets(2016, Policy 
Uncertainty and international Financial Markets: The case of Brexit, Angsar Belke, Irina 
Dubova, Thimas Osowaski), or the impact to the financial stability (2016, Brexit (Probability) 
and Effects on Financial Market Stability, T. Krause, F. Noth, Lena), as well as its connection 
with the political uncertainty (2016, “Brexit”: A case study in the relationship between political 
and financial market risk, Lee A. Smales). Nothing would be possible if Antulio N. Bomfim 
hasn’t published in 2001, “Pre-announcement effect, news effects and volatility: Monetary 
policy and stock market” in order to connect these two dots and macroeconomy with event 
studies. Moreover, other articles focused mainly on the economic impact of BREXIT, 
providing a theoretical macroeconomic view of such an event (2013, Europe without Britain, 
T. Oliver & 2016, BREXIT 2016 Policy Analysis from the Center for Economic Performance, 
LSE) So, by building up from there, we shall go one step further and analyze the impact to 
every EU country index (including UK at that point), testing for abnormal returns. Notable to 
us, was the work of Sathyanarayana and Gargesha, which assisted us gravely in the 
development of this work and we will not hide the fact that was an inspiration of our title (2016, 
Impact of BREXIT Referendum on Indian Stock Market, S. Sathyanarayana, S. Gargesha). 
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4 DATA 
The European Union is a tapestry of differently flavored countries, each with their own 
characteristics and paces. As we are interested in the European Union national stock indices 
market performance of each European Union country (sample of 28), our data are comprised 
by each and every national stock market index, as well as an international one for the market 
model necessary to our event study. Our database of choice is the Bloomberg one. Thus, 
collecting the time series for the 28 European Union members, plus the international equally 
weighted index, the Global Dow. All of our data are in the Euro currency and are consisted of 
271 daily observations. This amount is chosen since, in this way, we are able to extract 270 
daily return observations, and combining that with our event window duration which is -10 
days & + 10 days of the event of interest (announcement of the United Kingdom’s referendum 
results, 24/06/2016), we are able to provide 250 returns to our market model (from -260 to -
11), more on that on Methodology. 
One thing that should be mentioned here, is the fact that in almost all of the indices the data are 
not completely “synchronous” to each other, meaning that due to national holidays, special 
events, or even unreasonable cases certain national stock exchanges are not trading every day. 
This problem, of missing dates, can be tackled by either removing the missing date of the 
specific time series, from all the rest or by filling the missing day price from the previous (since 
the price has not altered as the stock exchange was closed). We have chosen the latter in order 
to avoid exceeding the annual performance of each stock exchange with respects to the global 
index (explaining, dates were adjusted according to the global information available, the 
calendar that the Global Dow was traded). 
Moreover, there are a lot of economic unions according to region and history. Main force of 
these unions is the economic dependence from each other, as they are traded in daily basis, for 
many decades. We identified the most interesting groups of countries for our event to 
investigate and measure the impact in countries that are inside the European Union. So, we 
attempted to group our data according to the followings. Initially, we measured the impact to 
the European Union as a whole and without the United Kingdom, as the country of the event. 
Secondly, we wanted to see that if there is a different amount of influence due to different 
currency, so we divide it to Eurozone and Non-Eurozone. Thirdly, the weak countries of 
European Union, that have the biggest debt as a percentage of the DGP and slow growth rates. 
That group of countries, the last few years, are the PIIGS and in addition how the rest of Europe 
handle that uncertainty. The last key characteristic that we used is the official regional 
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economic unions, and we chose the following: Baltic, Nordic, Benelux, British Isles, and the 
Balkans. 
In detail, the indices of each European Union country are the following and have been ordered 
(alphabetically) & abbreviated (according to Bloomberg’s tickers) as such: 00. GDOW 
(Global), 01. ATX (Austria), 02. BEL20 (Belgium), 03. SOFIX (Bulgaria), 04. CRO (Croatia), 
05. CYSMMAPA (Cyprus), 06. PX (Czech Republic), 07. KFX (Denmark), 08. TALSE 
(Estonia), 09. HEX (Finland), 10. CAC (France), 11. DAX (Germany), 12. ASE (Greece), 13. 
BUX (Hungary), 14. ISEQ (Ireland), 15. FTSEMIB (Italy), 16. RIGSE (Latvia), 17. VILSE 
(Lithuania), 18. LUXXX (Luxembourg) 19. MALTEX (Malta), 20. AEX (the Netherlands), 
21. WIG20 (Poland), 22. PSI20 (Portugal), 23. BET (Romania), 24. SKSM (Slovakia), 25. 
SBITOP (Slovenia), 26. IBEX (Spain), 27. OMX (Sweden), 28. UKX (the United Kingdom). 
For an even more detail data presentation please check Table 1.1., where one can find the 
Eurozone – Non-Eurozone separation, as well. 
To check our data for stationarity, we have used both the KPSS and the ADF test. All of our 
time series are integrated at I (1), so, in order to make them stationary we took the natural 
logarithms of their returns by: 
 
Rit = LN (Pit / Pit-1) 
 
Thus, testing again, as such, we have derived to stationarity, so, we were able to proceed with 
the estimations. 
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5 METHODOLOGY 
 
As it is already understood, so far, we are interested in applying the event study methodology 
for our quantitative research. An event study’s basic assumption is the one for the efficiency 
of the market (Efficient Market Hypothesis – EMH). An efficient market is one where the 
market price is an unbiased estimate of the true value of an investment, or better the impact of 
an event will be instantly reflected in stock prices. There are three forms of market efficiency, 
the weak form, the semi strong one, and the strong form efficiency. Elaborating, just a little, 
for the sake of academic purposes, we have: 
Under the weak form efficiency, the current price reflects the information contained in all past 
prices, suggesting that charts and technical analyses that use past prices alone would not be 
useful in finding mispriced stocks. 
Under the semi strong form efficiency, the current price reflects the information contained not 
only in past prices but all public information (including financial statements and news reports) 
and no approach that was predicated on using and messaging this information would be useful 
in finding mispriced stocks. 
Lastly, under the strong form efficiency, the current price reflects all the information, public as 
well private, implying that not even insider information could give an investor an advantage of 
identifying mispriced stocks. 
We consider the European Union’s national stock markets to have semi strong form efficiency, 
as information are widely and easily spread throughout the Union. However, as the practical 
saying goes in the professional world, that “most of the markets are efficient for most of the 
investors, most of the times, more or less”, here, there is a remarkable opportunity to test market 
efficiency as a whole. More of that can be found in the chapter 5 and 6. 
So, by trying to follow the event study methodology in order to come up with the results of our 
research, a lot of literature was investigated. As widely used by other articles, the “standard” 
methodology as it came up to be lately, presented by The Econometrics of Financial Markets 
(1997, J. Y. Campbell, A. C. Lo & A. C. MacKinlay), is applied here, as well. 
To outline our event study into steps, we have to explain the following: 
 
5.1 EVENT DEFINITION: 
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Our event of interest is the United Kingdom’s referendum, commonly known as BREXIT, 
calling the British people to the polls to answer the question "Should the United Kingdom 
remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?"1. Although, the polls 
took place at 23/06/2016, our date of interest is the next day (24/06/2016), when the national 
declaration of the referendum result took place. Not only that, we are also interested about the 
3, 5, 7, and 20 days window in order to capture the full motion of that event. 
Thus, setting as the event date (t=0) the one of 24/06/2016, as T0 the one of 26/06/2015, as T1 
the one of 10/06/2016, and as T2 the date of 08/07/2016, we have defined our windows 
appropriately. 
 
 
Estimation Period: (T0 to T1 -1 day) 26/06/2015 to 09/06/2016 (260 days) 
Event Window: (T1 to T2)  10/06/2016 to 08/07/2016 (21 days) 
Event Date:  (t=0)   24/06/2016   (1 day) 
 
5.2 SELECTION CRITERIA: 
Since our area of interest is all of the European Union, we have selected each and every national 
stock market index of the European Union members (as mentioned in the previous chapter: 
Data) to identify how they were impacted individually, in groups, and as a whole. No biases 
were introduced, since every country (national index) was included, no matter its performance 
or special events, as long as it is in the European Union, of course. 
5.3 NORMAL AND ABNORMAL RETURNS: 
After defining our windows and selecting our time series (national market indices daily prices), 
we must estimate the expected returns of each, as if the event did not occur, and then “extract” 
the abnormal ones. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-33141819 
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In order to do that, we have to calculate the normal returns, at first, during the windows. The 
normal returns are calculated using the natural logarithms of the returns, with the formula: 
 
Rit = LN (Pt / Pt-1) 
 
To estimate the expected returns during the event window (as if the event did not occur), we 
employ the market model, alone, as previous research done, indicates that “beyond a simple, 
one-market model, there is no evidence that more complicated methodologies convey any 
benefit” (1980, Measuring Security Price Performance, S. J. Brown, J. B. Warner). 
 
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit, E (εit) = 0, Var (εit) = σ2εi 
where Rit and Rmt are the period-t returns on security i and the market portfolio, respectively, 
and εit is the zero-mean disturbance term. αi, βi and σ2εi are the parameters of the market model. 
 
In order to appraise the impact of the event, we have to calculate the abnormal return during 
the event window by extracting the residuals: 
 
ε*it = Rit – E (Rit | Xt) 
where ε*it, Rit and E (Rit) are the abnormal, actual, and normal returns, respectively, for time 
period t. Xt is the conditioning information for the normal performance model. 
Thus, by taking the normal returns at the time of the event (and during the event window, of 
course), we derive to the abnormal ones for each national stock market index. 
5.4 ESTIMATION PROCEDURE:  
As we have defined how we went about identifying abnormal returns and our normal 
performing model (market model), the parameters of the model are estimated via the estimation 
window. Our estimation window duration has been set to 250 days prior the event window (-
10, +10 days), as had been explained in the data chapter. Of course, the estimation period is 
not included in the event one, in order to avoid any influence on the normal performance model 
parameter estimates. A small duration event window is used because this can always lead to 
better and more robust results, according to McWilliams and Siegel (1997), capturing, much 
better, the consequences that an announcement has on the share prices due to the new 
information being released in the market. Also, a longer duration would violate the market 
efficiency assumptions. 
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5.5 TESTING PROCEDURE:  
Having identified the parameters for the normal performing model, the abnormal returns are 
calculated. In order to test the abnormal returns for significance, we have used the t-test and 
applied the hypothesis testing procedure. Our null hypothesis for the abnormal returns (ARi) 
is set as 0 abnormal returns and our alternative one is other than 0 for every national market 
index during the event period. 
 
H0: ARi = 0 
H1: ARi ≠ 0 
 
Here should be noted that our significance level of choice is 5%, which we believe is enough 
to justify any abnormality in return, due to the event (t critical = 1.960). 
Moreover, to capture the overall impact of event during our period of interest, we calculate the 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns, through time (-3 to +3 days), using the hypothesis testing 
procedure, as applied to the Abnormal Returns testing procedure. 
 
H0: CARi = 0 
H1: CARi ≠ 0 
 
Also, we have to inform that we inspected, extensively, this period of interest of -3 and +3 days 
to identify any abnormality, not only on the event day, but also on the adjacent dates. All that 
for each specific national stock market index. 
5.5.1 Cross-Sectional Testing: 
To move one step further, we have aggregated the Abnormal and the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns into Average Abnormal Returns (AARi) and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
(CAARi), testing them using the cross-sectional t-test procedure, applying the hypothesis 
testing procedure, as well. 
 
H0: AARi = 0 
H1: AARi ≠ 0 
 
H0: CAARi = 0 
H1: CAARi ≠ 0 
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This aggregation, through countries (national market indices), was a result of our endeavor to 
answer our questions of who were worst off. More specifically, by aggregating among 
European Union, United Kingdom, Eurozone, Non-Eurozone, and PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece, and Spain), we are able to compare the impact of Brexit among these groups. 
Not only that, we extend this aggregation to other economic unions of the European Union, by 
aggregating for the Baltic, Nordic, Benelux, British Isles, and the Balkans (NOTE: For the 
countries of these Unions that belong in the European Union, of course.) 
After that, we draw our results, in the forms which are explained seen below. 
5.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Having found out the magnitude and significance of abnormality for every national market 
index, we have shaped our results in a sorting fashion, from greatest to least impact (abnormal 
returns), producing two tables, one for the Abnormal Returns (ARi) at the day of the event 
(t=0) and another for the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARi) for the period -1and +1 days, 
where the abnormality is found to be the most significant. Please, see appendix Table 2.1. 
Also, we attempt to explain (in chapter 4), the financial and economic impact, as well as, our 
expectations, for each of the European Union’s national stock market index, the European 
Union as a whole, the Eurozone and non-Eurozone results (currency impact), the weakest 
economies, and finally the impact to other economic unions of the European Union. 
5.7 ADDITIONAL STEPS: 
5.7.1 Regression Analysis 
 
To understand the driving force, or the economic one if you prefer, of our empirical results of 
the event study, we shall attempt to generate a regression model to find out about the factor 
that explain the empirical results as to with each national market index is more or less affected 
by the UK’s Referendum. Thus, utilizing the multivariate linear regression, we identify three 
possible factors explaining the results, through a structural econometric model 
 
yi = ai + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3 X3+ ei 
 
As our y variable (dependent) we have chosen the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
(CARi) for -1, +1 days from the event date and as x variables (independent) Debt / GDP,  
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F [(value of exports + value of imports) With U.K. / (Total sum of exports + imports)], and the 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CARi) for -5 to -1 days from the event date. 
In this way, we try to explain the abnormality – severity of the impact to all of the European 
Union countries as a function of the indebtedness, the trade, and the rumors or insider trading 
before the event. The result, of this regression is quite interesting, as it explains pretty well the 
abnormality around the event date (-1, +1, around the date to be exact). More on that on the 
next chapter. 
5.7.2 Robustness Test 
In order to be 100% sure about the expectations of the significance of our results and their 
robustness through time and across groups (as expected), we have applied a kind of customized 
test of the robustness one by checking the significance (at 95%, as always) of the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARi) and the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARi) for the 
periods (-3, -1), (-5, -1) or (-10, -1). In this way, we are able to assess the presence of insider 
information, propaganda, and predisposition on the decision of the British people. 
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6 RESULTS 
6.1 WHAT ARE OUR EXPECTATIONS? ECONOMIC EXPLANATION 
Our expectations originate from the economic theory and the effect of uncertainty due to the 
increase of volatility in stock market (finance based measurement) to macroeconomic 
performance. The uncertainty and risk in practice imply the divergence of opinion, and it is 
clear from the referendum’s results, almost 50-50, that no one can predict not even the near 
future. 
Here the forecasts are in disagreement, which create the tendency to the long-term yield to 
maturity of the 10 Year-bond of each specific country to fall slightly and they have negative 
correlation with Treasury-Bills (Markus Leippold, Felix H. A. Matthys,2015). The countries 
that already have relative high bond yield will be influenced the most, as they are more fragile 
and sensitive due to the already existed risk of default. 
The fall of the stock market, in addition to the above, and the expected increase of interest rates 
causes a wave of inflation. In European Union due to Quantitative Easing From the ECB, the 
interest rates do not get influenced at all. There is a small change in inflation though, and the 
cost of that goes to businesses mainly and to customers. 
Another effect is that since the value of market shrink, money strengthen and the cost of 
borrowing increases, since the investments that period reduces. That influence mainly the 
banks and the interbank system. Since there is that particular movement in the market, the debt 
has a different value as well. 
A large debt encourages inflation additionally and if inflation is high, the debt will be serviced 
and ultimately paid off with cheaper real euros in the future. How much is the country going 
to be influenced is a different issue, because the structure of debt has a crucial part as well. In 
other words, to whom one country owe money to. This measurement has the ability to identify 
the trade and independence of countries. There are two types of debts: Government debt that 
has borrowed primarily from the private sector and External debt that owe to the rest of the 
world. The countries that hold the external debt of United Kingdom will have straight impact 
at their finances and there will be a direct impact. Since the foreign investors now are not 
willing to receive the same performance and return from the bonds with higher risk.  
Trading Volume between countries has a major role as well. So, if the value of exports and 
imports for each country individually has a relative high percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) will be high influenced, since with Brexit on the table these will be limited, as a wave 
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of certainty occurs. The Openness with U.K. between two countries is also an indicator of a 
well political history. 
All the variables above are considered representative indicators for the political future. We 
expect the countries or a group of countries with a big number of political and economic 
changes to be more fragile to environment of uncertainty that prevails. In investments and in 
the world of money markets, trust is the key. There is no trust without stability, both in 
quantitative and qualitative evaluation. 
Since United Kingdom was between the three big forces of European Union, with France and 
Germany, the relative position of the other two strengthen and on the other hand the rest of the 
countries is getting relative weaker. It may not be the first thought of citizens of European 
Union, but we expect the market to return in previous levels in the first 10 days.  
According to the above, it is easier to identify the countries that are going to be influenced 
more than the rest, except from the United Kingdom, that is the country of the event, are the 
PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain). There are a lot of common characteristics about 
these countries such as relative high bond yields with high level of debt, political and economic 
instability, low growth rates and relative high deficit. Furthermore, the Balkans and the Baltics 
have less economic dependence from United Kingdom since they are trading, in bigger 
frequency and value, with other neighbor countries like Russia, Turkey and Germany. 
Scandinavian countries, we expect not to be influenced due to their strong and stable economic 
performance.  
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6.2 EVENT STUDY RESULTS PER COUNTRY (AR & CAR ANALYSIS) 
The results from the analysis from country to country is the answers to the following questions: 
• Is ARi significant in time 0? If yes, for how many days these abnormal returns are 
continued? 
The answer will show us, if this event is significant and for how many days this effect 
continued in same levels. 
• Is CARi Significant in any time? If yes, is this time, the time 0 or after? If yes, what is 
the highest number of time that CARi is significant? 
The answer will show us, if the average abnormal returns all the previous day have 
affected and for how long. The highest the number of time of significance, the greater 
the influence.  
• Is any significance in CARi (-1, +1), (-2, +2) or (-3, +3)? If yes, in which ones?  
The answer will show us, if there is a significance influence around the period of the 
event which is the most crucial. The longer the period, the greater the influence. 
• Is any significance in CARi (-3, -1), (-5, -1) or (-10, -1)? If yes, in which ones? 
The period before the time zero, we measure the expectations of people from every 
country. If the sign is the same with the one of our event, then there is inside 
information, but if is the opposite, then there is a propaganda from the media to drive 
public opinion to the opposite direction. 
 
Austria: See Table 2.1 And picture 2.1 
In that case of Austria, the day of the event, the returns are significant different from the normal 
performance of the stock market with negative results, and this continued until the second day, 
which is a great and fast drop in the stock market of Austria. It is normal after that information 
to find CARi (-1 +1) will be easily significant. In case of CARi, the highest number of 
significance is 8, which is relative a high number, which translate that Austria have influenced 
by the referendum of Brexit for several days and in relative large amounts. This is confirmed 
in our next observation from CARi (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) are significant, and with that the 
referendum in United Kingdom can recognized are a major event for the area of Austria. In the 
end, we can find a high significant level of influence for CARi (-5, -1) only, which means that 
the last week before the event, the stock exchange market has noted an abnormal increase in 
returns. This is the opposite sign of the actual performance after the event. The demand due to 
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the referendum, show us that the majority of investors in Austria believed that United Kingdom 
will vote to stay in European Union, due to media and exit polls. 
 
Similarly, we worked in the rest of the countries. 
(Belgium: See Table 2.2 And picture 2.2, Bulgaria: See Table 2.3 And picture 2.3, Croatia: See 
Table 2.4 And picture 2.4, Cyprus: See Table 2.5 And picture 2.5, Czech Republic: See Table 
2.6 And picture 2.6, Denmark: See Table 2.7 And picture 2.7, Estonia: See Table 2.8 And 
picture 2.8, Finland: See Table 2.9 And picture 2.9, France: See Table 2.10 And picture 2.10, 
Germany: See Table 2.11 And picture 2.11, Greece: See Table 2.12 And picture 2.12, Hungary: 
See Table 2.13 And picture 2.13, Ireland: See Table 2.14 And picture 2.14, Italy: See Table 
2.15 And picture 2.15, Latvia: See Table 2.16 And picture 2.16, Lithuania: See Table 2.17 And 
picture 2.17, Luxembourg: See Table 2.18 And picture 2.18, Malta: See Table 2.19 And picture 
2.19, Netherlands: See Table 2.20 And picture 2.20, Poland: See Table 2.21 And picture 2.21, 
Portugal: See Table 2.22 And picture 2.22, Romania: See Table 2.23 And picture 2.23, 
Slovakia: See Table 2.24 And picture 2.24, Slovenia: See Table 2.25 And picture 2.25, Spain: 
See Table 2.26 And picture 2.26, Sweden: See Table 2.27 And picture 2.27, United Kingdom: 
See Table 2.28 And picture 2.28) 
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6.3 CROSS SECTIONAL RESULTS (CAAR ANALYSIS) 
There are a lot of economic unions according to region and history. Main force of these unions 
is the economic dependence from each other, as they trade in daily basis for many decades. We 
valued the most interesting groups of countries for our event to investigate and measure the 
impact in countries that are inside the European Union. Initially, we measure the impact 
European Union as a whole and without the United Kingdom, as the country of the event. We 
wanted to see the if there a different amount of influence due to different currency, so we divide 
it to Eurozone and Non-Eurozone. The weak countries of the European Union, that have the 
biggest debt as a percentage of the DGP and slow growth rates. That group of countries, the 
last few years, are PIIGS and we measure in addition how the rest of Europe handle that 
uncertainty. The last key characteristic that we used is the official regional economic unions, 
and we chose the following: Baltic, Nordic, Benelux, British Isles, and the Balkans. 
6.3.1 Groups (Aggregations) of Interest 
6.3.1.1 European Union  
It is clear from the graph that the overall impact of the referendum had a negative effect in the 
stock markets of European Union, but there is no sign of propaganda and any mislead in 
average to investors. A well-informed market is a sign of EMH but due to the fact that we find 
evidence of significant abnormal returns in AAR1, AAR2 and CAARi (-1, +1), we reject that 
the market is efficient and definitely not in strong form. So, the referendum can be considered 
a major economic event due to the drop of stock market by 4,85% in the first two days of 
announcement. 
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6.3.1.2 European Union Less United Kingdom 
In that graph, we cancel out United Kingdom in order to observe the change in the drop and in 
what level does European Union is affected by one country. We can see that the graph is similar 
to the previous one. That means, there are countries that affected in the same or higher amount 
than United Kingdom. It is the first interesting result of our research, that drive us to search 
deeper to find the weaker links of this political and economic event. As we expected the results 
in terms of significant were the same as European Union as a whole. 
 
6.3.2 Currency 
6.3.2.1 Eurozone 
The purpose of that is to actually find if the Euro is strong enough and protect their countries. 
It may the graph seems similar and in terms of significance in abnormal returns, but actually 
we can observe in the details that Eurozone affected slightly more than the European Union. 
That means that the Euro doesn’t help their countries for sure and even the country of the event, 
use the Pound. These new are not good for the Eurozone and the power of the currency but are 
representative of the real power of Euro. 
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6.3.2.2 Non-Eurozone 
In countries that don’t use Euro as main currency, the volatility of their stock market was to 
minimum and the only significant amount of change in abnormal returns by 3,53%, was the 
day of the announcement of the results at the CAARi (-1, +1) measure, which means that only 
that day there was a change and not the entire 20 days around the event. 
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6.3.3 Weak Link of European Union 
6.3.3.1 PIIGS 
The last years, the European Union endorse specific countries with the same characteristics of 
bad results. These countries are considered the weak link of European Union and in these times 
of uncertainty are the first ones that lose. But how much are they lost? The results are absolutely 
huge. We can also notice from the graph that there is an absolutely huge drop in stock markets 
equal to almost 12% and stay in that level the next days as well. We can conclude from CAAR8 
that is significant, which means that the last 18 days there is a significant drop in the stock 
market of these countries. Of course, CAARi (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) are easily significant 
and there is another interesting information that the CAARi (-5, -1) is not significant with a 
positive sign by a little. 
 
6.3.3.2 European Union Less PIIGS 
Here the results may be significant in CAARi (-1, +1) but the drop in the stock market is less 
than the average of European Union. The results are very expected for that group of countries, 
that have a relative stronger economy 
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6.3.4 Regional Economic Unions 
6.3.4.1 Baltic 
    SIGN? Robustness  SIGN?  
CAARi (-1, +1) -1,31% NO CAARi (-3, -1) -0,53% NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -1,06% NO CAARi (-5, -1) -0,81% NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -0,58% NO CAARi (-10, -1) -2,52% NO 
In that area, we don’t find any significant change in abnormal returns in any time, which means 
despite the political instability the citizens of these counties are were well informed as we can 
see that little by little the returns are dropping as they are already knew the result of referendum. 
As an addition, their market slowly raises after the event to its natural level. They are prepared 
for a situation like that, and they don’t have the closest relation with Great Britain. 
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6.3.4.2 Nordic 
    SIGN? Robustness   SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -3,43% YES CAARi (-3, -1) 0,71% NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -1,28% NO CAARi (-5, -1) 2,76% NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -0,72% NO CAARi (-10, -1) -1,24% NO 
 
In this region, due to the strong economic history, great performance in macroeconomic 
variables and political stability, we expected that will actually benefit from this uncertainty in 
the European Union. We find interesting about this region that the two of its representations 
(Finland and Sweden) had significant positive Abnormal Returns the day of the event, and 
triggered us to search about the regional unit. The same expectation with the initial had the 
investors of those stock markets and that’s why they note positive abnormal returns the day of 
the announcement which is significant and with a positive sign. It follows a sharp drop, because 
they understood that the relative position advantage that they gain through the exit of United 
Kingdom in European Union was not enough to cover the losses from the trade with them. The 
drop was so deep that the CAARi (-1, +1) is significant, although of that positive abnormal 
returns. 
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6.3.4.3 Benelux 
    SIGN? Robustness   SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -4,74% YES CAARi (-3, -1) 1,12% NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -3,55% NO CAARi (-5, -1) 3,50% NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -3,32% NO CAARi (-10, -1) 0,81% NO 
In the center of Europe and three of the closest countries to United Kingdom, BENELUX show 
us if a smaller economic union protect their countries and the answer definitely is no, even if 
in that case as well, there are positive abnormal returns the day of the referendum followed by 
a sharp drop of stock market of 5,84% in two days. We can observe, even if the CAARi (-5, -
1) is insignificant, there are positive cumulative returns, which is in the opposite direction of 
the event. 
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6.3.4.4 British Isles 
    SIGN? Robustness  SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -11,10% YES CAARi (-3, -1) 0,93% NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -8,41% YES CAARi (-5, -1) 5,59% YES 
CAARi (-3, +3) -7,28% YES CAARi (-10, -1) 1,84% NO 
 
For that regional economic Union, disagreement is the representative word to describe the 
situation, since the results of United Kingdom and Ireland was positive before the 
announcement of referendum and the drop after was extremely sharp. Media have a big part of 
that upward trend due to the formed opinion about the results. The expectations are the opposite 
of the result and one of the reasons of that kind of continuous drop. 
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6.3.4.5 Balkans (without Greece) 
    SIGN? Robustness   SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -1.36% NO CAARi (-3, -1) 0.41% NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -0.06% NO CAARi (-5, -1) 0.55% NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -0.45% NO CAARi (-10, -1) 0.61% NO 
 
The Balkans have been considered a grey area for the European Union, both due to historical 
events and due to the great influence from other economic forces (e.g. Russia). Although, 
during the last decades the countries of the Balkans have quite been westernized and developed, 
still, their economies are characterized as weak. The European Union’s countries of the Balkans 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Slovenia), being the strongest economically, show no sign of 
significance from the event according to CAARi. (-1, +1,) to CAARi (-3, +3). Even the 
robustness check indicates no significance, meaning that no affecting information existed 
before the event. Moreover, as most of the Europeans Union’s Balkan countries are not inside 
the Eurozone (apart from Slovenia), explains a bit this apathy as to Brexit. Finally, only on the 
day of the event the AARi (t=0) was significantly low at -1.35% with a t value of -2.004, but 
this is very close to the rejection region of 0 abnormal returns, reassuring us about the absence 
of affection of these countries due to the event. 
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6.4 COMBINATION AND COMPARISONS OF RESULTS   
6.4.1 Ranking According to AR(t=0) and CAR (+1, -1) 
Country Ari at t=0 SIGN? Country CARi (-1, +1) SIGN? 
Greece -11,42% YES Ireland -14,05% YES 
Spain -9,12% YES Greece -13,06% YES 
Italy -8,74% YES Italy -8,64% YES 
Ireland -5,07% YES Spain -8,46% YES 
United Kingdom -4,56% YES United Kingdom -8,15% YES 
France -4,31% YES Austria -7,03% YES 
Poland -3,96% YES Belgium -6,02% YES 
Austria -3,87% YES Luxembourg -5,43% YES 
Portugal -3,73% YES Czech Republic -5,34% YES 
Hungary -3,45% YES France -5,06% YES 
Belgium -3,39% YES Sweden -4,99% YES 
Luxembourg -3,32% YES European Union -4,39% YES 
Cyprus -3,28% YES Cyprus -4,37% YES 
Germany -3,10% YES Hungary -4,30% YES 
European Union -2,59% YES Portugal -4,27% YES 
Romania -2,27% YES Germany -4,02% YES 
Czech Republic -2,19% YES Finland -3,91% YES 
Netherlands -1,97% YES Poland -3,63% NO 
Slovenia -1,47% YES Netherlands -2,75% YES 
Croatia -1,02% YES Romania -1,75% NO 
Bulgaria -0,65% NO Latvia -1,59% NO 
Malta -0,58% NO Slovenia -1,48% NO 
Slovakia 0,01% NO Denmark -1,40% NO 
Latvia 0,05% NO Croatia -1,27% NO 
Denmark 0,21% NO Lithuania -1,22% NO 
Lithuania 0,54% NO Estonia -1,11% NO 
Estonia 0,71% NO Bulgaria -0,93% NO 
Finland 3,36% YES Malta -0,25% NO 
Sweden 4,11% YES Slovakia 1,61% NO 
 
We cannot hide our initial expectation of the United Kingdom to be impacted the most, out of 
the event of Brexit Referendum, as country leaving a powerful union is expected to do worst 
in the capital markets than the larger union itself. However, by digging and analyzing deeper, 
we have come up to some interesting results.  
As can be seen in both the benchmarking tables (Ari at t=0 Ordering and CARi (-1, +1) 
Ordering), the United Kingdom’s national index was 3rd (ARi, -4.56%) and 5th place (CARi (-
1, +1), -8.15%). The other rest of the 5 first positions are held by the PIIGS countries’ indices 
(ISEQ, FTSEMIB, ASE, IBEX), apart from Portugal (PSI20). This, while not shocking, but 
quite unexpected finding, since the event is one country focused, gives us the great insight that 
from the Brexit Referendum, or in general from an uncertainty inducing event, the markets that 
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are impacted the most are the weakest, more volatile ones. After PIIGS the countries that 
affected are its neighbors such as France and Belgium. A big surprise was Austria that we 
didn’t has any indicator for that kind of drop. After a closer look Austria has a large number of 
subsidiaries in United Kingdom and large amount of trading volume. On the bottom of the ARi 
ordering table, are the two Nordic countries of European Union with significant positive 
returns, but the market corrects its self in just a day, and there is an extreme drop the next day. 
So, in the end of day 1, the Balkans and the Baltics were stronger than everyone else in the 
European Union.  
 
6.4.2 European Union Less United Kingdom vs United Kingdom 
 
European Union Less UK 
 
SIGN? United Kingdom 
 
SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -4,25% YES CARi (-1, +1) -8,15% YES 
CAARi (-2, +2) -2,72% NO CARi (-2, +2) -5,35% YES 
CAARi (-3, +3) -2,67% NO CARi (-3, +3) -3,35% NO 
In the beginning of that paper, we though that this is its purpose and we will analyze in deep 
that specific graph. But we can observe, that in comparison United Kingdom was expecting 
that the results of the referendum would be to stay in the European Union, and this is the main 
reason for that fast drop in just a day, in order to meet in the exact same point, the European 
Union. The damage was the same, but expectations were different, and that’s why the fall of 
the United Kingdom Stock Market was significant even and in CARi (-2, +2). 
  
-6.00%
-5.00%
-4.00%
-3.00%
-2.00%
-1.00%
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
C
A
A
R
i
T
European Union Less United Kingdom vs United Kingdom
EU Less UK
UK
 38 | P a g e  
 
6.4.3 Eurozone vs Non-Eurozone 
Eurozone 
 
SIGN? Non-Eurozone 
 
SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -4,80% YES CAARi (-1, +1) -3,53% YES 
CAARi (-2, +2) -3,45% NO CAARi (-2, +2) -1,48% NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -3,27% NO CAARi (-3, +3) -1,47% NO 
 
Here, as well the impact is more significantly depected by the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAARi (-1, +1)) as the Eurozone market indices were -4.80% against a -3.53% for the Non-
Eurozone ones. The impact was greater for the Eurozone countries, as not expected at all. That 
question  heavily the power of Euro and the exact reasons behind that change in the drop of 
stocks with different currencies.  
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6.4.4 European Union Less PIIGS vs PIIGS 
 
EU Less PIIGS 
 
SIGN? PIIGS 
 
SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -3,24% YES CAARi (-1, +1) -9,70% YES 
CAARi (-2, +2) -1,80% NO CAARi (-2, +2) -7,48% YES 
CAARi (-3, +3) -1,73% NO CAARi (-3, +3) -7,09% YES 
This heavier impact insight is also reinforced by the aggregation of Abnormal Returns (AARi) 
of the PIIGS, compared with those of the European Union as a whole (Less PIIGS). This great 
impact is significantly depicted by the CAARi (-1, +1) where EU without the PIIGS was -
3.24% where for the PIIGS was -9.70%. 
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6.5 DOES THE RESULTS MEET OUR EXPECTATIONS? 
6.5.1 Results of Previous Studies 
One year after Brexit, Richard C. K. Burdekin, Eric Hughson & Jinlin Gu published an article 
about called “A first look at Brexit and global equity markets”. It is clear that, they used stocks 
worldwide (64 stock exchanges, 41 countries) to understand the impact in global scale, by 
measuring these stocks exchanges. They conclude that not every country reacted to the same 
direction, for example PIIGS and BRICS have an extra interest of research for their bad and 
good results respectively. So, in addition to the previous, bad political news doesn’t have 
always bad results on the stock market, but which are the factors affecting it? All in all, the 
paper proves that Brexit had a big negative effect on stock market worldwide, especially on the 
ones in the European Union, and that was one of the main reason why we dig in the area of the 
event. They used two main variables and three dummies (BRICS, PIIGS, Eurozone) that 
covered the 65% of the results. We inspired by that procedure and we alternate one variable, 
we add another and remove all dummies and the results are magnificent. The previous question, 
also tried to answer, with a PARCH (Power GARCH, combination with a dummy variable 
“Brexit”) model approach, Boris van Bruggen in 2016, but with completely different variables 
(dividend yield, industrial production, inflation, trading volume, stock market volatility and the 
Amihud illiquidity measure, e relative exchange rate). There is another paper that influence our 
paper heavily in order to understand the inside effects of such an event in a country and what 
particular sectors damaged the most, and that is the work of Ramiah, Pham and Moosa (2016). 
That paper showed us that the macroeconomic variables affected the most and also the export 
would be influenced the most, and that’s why we used a variable for both of these information 
in our regression. 
6.5.2 Selection of Metric Explanation 
In order to find the reasons behind the results, we conduct a regression analysis with various 
variables. We focus in 28 countries of European Union, except United Kingdom, and as the 
dependent variable we chose CARi (-1, +1) since we believe that this is the most representative 
results, because it includes a day before, a day after the announcement and the day of the event, 
as Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) in their study argued that returns on the special event 
days are more volatile than returns on the non-event days, and we want it the overall picture of 
the short-term influence in the markets. As explanation of such results, we focus on economic 
related and political variables, and for your information, we didn’t find any significance in the 
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following variables: interest rates, bond yields, political stability and political events the 
previous year, distance from United Kingdom, number of immigrants of each country in United 
Kingdom, past wars (ally, enemy or neutral), currency. The systematic factors underlying the 
stock market return, in the paper of Chen, Roll and Ross (1986), a set of macroeconomic 
variables are compiled that are expected to have an effect on the stock market returns. The set 
of variables consists of the inflation rate, the treasury-bill rate, the long-term government 
bonds, industrial production, low-grade bonds, equally weighted equities, value-weighted 
equities, consumption and oil price. The reason behind that insignificance is the power of 
European Central Bank and the Quantitative Easing policy that have adopted from March 2015. 
The effects of that policy shown in the stability of interest rates that strengthen and secure high 
volatility in prices of market and built a wall of protection against uncertainty. In the paper of 
July 2016 by Boris van Bruggen, he analyzes the announcement effects on the United Kingdom 
stock market and the reasons behind that change in prices in one day. We focus in the European 
Union, except the United Kingdom, in order to find out if are the same variables significant to 
the domain research. We had the same procedure for variable selection, but the results were 
completely different. Nowadays, the economic position of a country measured by the 
percentage of its debt to GDP, which means that a country is fragile or not relative to others. 
In addition, in such an event the direct economic dependence with the country of the event 
must have a big influence in the dependent variable.  
“We show that the overall short-run trade impact on the UK’s goods trade due to Brexit is less 
than 2 percent. This result assumes that the UK will not have any preferential access to the EU 
market and all its products will enter the EU, the US and China on the Most Favored Nations 
(MFN) basis. This result also assumes that in the short-run, firms and investments are not free 
to move across borders. The long-run consequences of Brexit most likely depend on whether 
the UK can continue to attract and retain its foreign direct investment. “(Hiau Looi Keey, 
Alessandro Nicit, 2017) 
In order to turn the previous sentence into a numerical one and to show the relation of every 
country separately, we add up the exports and imports in terms of value with the United 
Kingdom and we divide this with the total sum of exports and imports of each country to find 
out the dependence of earning with United Kingdom in the trade balance. In first place, we had 
divide the sum of imports and exports with United Kingdom with the GDP of every country as 
Richard C. K. Burdekin, Eric Hughson & Jinlin Gu (2017, “A first look at Brexit and global 
equity markets”) uses the variable openness, but seems insignificant. That is since countries 
and policies uncertainty created in times of unexpected results, and a “bad” result is not always 
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unexpected. So, the variables that includes that information is the one who we chose, because 
it shows how much a country has indirectly invested a part of its trading volume in United 
Kingdom. So, we have the following variables: 
The results of that paper are focus globally in equity markets and identify debt as the number 
one independent variable. In addition to the previous findings, there are papers that measure 
the percentage drop or rise of every sector separately, and found that the three variables with 
the most significant drop are real estate, banks and insurance, which is mainly macroeconomic 
factors, strictly connected with the trust of citizens to the government. That loss of trust, we 
tried to measure it and fail, but we found the reasons behind its existence. So, media and 
common opinion about the event plays an important role, so any surprise causes a negative 
effect in the stock prices. In other words, if the investors expect that drop, they are prepared 
and are getting the proper actions to avoid losses, so there is not a significance drop of the stock 
market. The variable that shows the 5 previous days of the event can be a representative 
variable of the previous theory. In addition, in the research about the factors that affected the 
result of the referendum, was not the media, but the R2 was relative small to 57,7%, so we 
figure out that there is something missing from it (Sofia Vasilopoulou, 2016). 
6.5.3 Results of the Metric Explanation 
It is clear that with only three variables, the results for such a complicated matter, can be explain 
the 75,8% of its results. We observe that the P-value of each variable is 0,0018 for the CARi (-
5, -1), 0,0082 for the Debt/ GDP and 0,0014 for Openness with U.K. which are extremely small 
and make all the variable significant. The f-statistic for the three variables is 24,04 and the 
critical value of F with 23 Degrees of freedom and a=0,05 is 3,02, which is smaller than the F-
statistic. The significance of F is extremely small which shows the percentage of failure of our 
model. Another conclusion of the ANOVA is that all coefficients have negative sign and the 
most significant one is CARi (-5, -1). We can say that as long as a country have a large 
percentage of debt, will reflect negatively the results of the event, as there will be a drop in 
CARi (-1, +1). In addition, the bigger the Openness with U.K., the bigger the drop. And in the 
end, the biggest influence has the market the previous days, which means that if the market has 
an upwards trend in Abnormal Returns will have a quick drop and vice versa. 
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COUNTRY CAR(-1, +1) CARi(-5 , -1) 
Debt/GDP 
(t=0) 
Openness with U.K. 
(t=2015) 
AUSTRIA -7,03% 4,27% 84,60% 2,53% 
BELGIUM -6,02% 3,42% 105,90% 7,24% 
BULGARIA -0,93% 0,86% 29,50% 2,15% 
CROATIA -1,27% -0,48% 84,20% 1,40% 
CYPRUS -4,37% 0,19% 107,80% 6,92% 
CZECH REPUBLIC -5,34% 2,99% 37,20% 3,77% 
DENMARK -1,40% 2,49% 37,80% 5,52% 
ESTONIA -1,11% -1,02% 95,00% 2,63% 
FINLAND -3,91% 1,78% 63,60% 4,05% 
FRANCE -5,06% 4,07% 96,00% 5,67% 
GERMANY -4,02% 4,01% 68,30% 5,98% 
GREECE -13,06% 8,30% 179,00% 3,45% 
HUNGARY -4,30% 1,76% 74,10% 2,99% 
IRELAND -14,05% 5,11% 75,40% 17,41% 
ITALY -8,64% 6,12% 132,60% 4,27% 
LATVIA -1,59% -1,40% 40,10% 3,71% 
LITHUANIA -1,22% -0,02% 40,20% 4,05% 
LUXEMBOURG -5,43% 3,00% 20,00% 7,24% 
MALTA -0,25% 0,81% 58,30% 4,34% 
NETHERLANDS -2,75% 4,08% 62,30% 7,73% 
POLAND -3,63% 6,08% 54,40% 4,83% 
PORTUGAL -4,27% 3,24% 130,40% 4,71% 
ROMANIA -1,75% -0,10% 37,60% 3,20% 
SLOVAKIA 1,61% 1,62% 51,90% 3,43% 
SLOVENIA -1,48% 1,93% 79,70% 1,87% 
SPAIN -8,46% 5,12% 99,40% 6,19% 
SWEDEN -4,99% 4,02% 41,60% 6,46% 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT                 
           
Regression Statistics  ANOVA       
Multiple R 0,870754768    df SS MS F Significance F 
R Square 0,758213866  Regression 3 0,026269144 0,008756381 24,04179624 2,82727E-07 
Adjusted R Square 0,726676544  Residual 23 0,008376944 0,000364215 Critical Value at 0,05   
Standard Error 0,019084416  Total 26 0,034646088   3,027998382   
Observations 27         
           
Variables Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,02486506 0,010507322 2,366450722 0,026759125 0,003129008 0,046601112 0,003129008 0,046601112 
CARi(-5 , -1) -0,682741275 0,193746556 -3,523888579 0,001818935 -1,083536562 -0,281945988 -1,083536562 -0,281945988 
Debt/GDP -0,034038217 0,011776372 -2,890382339 0,008254063 -0,058399499 -0,009676936 -0,058399499 -0,009676936 
Openness with U.K. -0,485372436 0,134661369 -3,604392557 0,001493884 -0,763940702 -0,20680417 -0,763940702 -0,20680417 
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7 CONCLUSION 
7.1 SUMMARY DISCUSSION 
The overall picture of this paper is about the surprise of the people of European Union with the 
unexpected decision not to be part of that Union anymore. It is shown the expectations of 
investors and stakeholders of every country’s public companies for how much is it going to 
affect their economy and the market balance. The goal is to investigate if there is a significant 
effect of the announcement of the results of the referendum that Great Britain will leave 
European Union, in the countries that belong in it, and the factors behind that attitude of the 
stock market of each county individually and in specialized group of countries depending on 
characteristics. Volatility measure uncertainty, and prices measures political independence in 
our case, as event studies deepen our understanding of regulations and political decision 
making. 
In order to conduct a representative event study that can fully describe the effects, we chose 
the 28 countries that are in the European Union, as the most direct to the problem. It was clear 
from the beginning that the answer to our initial question wasn’t that easy. We make an 
ordering table of the countries for the CARi (-1, +1), to have the overall picture, and after that 
we conduct a metric explanation we that as a dependent variable. We establish that one of the 
many variables that are significant is the Debt/GDP with no surprise here. But the two other 
are the innovative idea about this paper. Openness with United Kingdom, which is the 
percentage of total exports and imports with the U.K. and not with the value of exports and 
imports with U.K. divide to GDP, have more influence from the previous one. The third 
independent variable is the answer to the following question: “Does the investors we found off 
guard? “. CARi (-5, -1) describes fully the previous days of the event and what the investors 
thought that will happen to the results of the referendum and as conscience to the rise of the 
stock market, as a confidence sign. That help us to conclude one more time that the market is 
not efficient. 
But another outcome of the ordering table is that we had the opportunity to identify some 
pattern after a closer look, and verify all the previous results. Euro doesn’t help us in that 
particular event because the eurozone have high volume of trade with the United Kingdom and 
have made major investments towards that country, but the results of not-Euro countries are 
slightly better. Furthermore, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain are on top of the list, so 
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PIIGS have a difficulty to absorb the uncertainty that have created in just one day, due to 
different value of their debt after the event. The regional European union that affected the most 
were British Isles as the countries of the union is Great Britain, the country of the event, and 
Ireland, member of PIIGS. After that Benelux and Nordic countries have significant drop in 
their stock market, as they trade and connect with Great Britain in high volume. With 
insignificant drop in the stock market had the Baltic, and in the end the Balkans (without 
Greece) had positive Abnormal Returns after two days of the event, which opposite of the 
general trend in the rest of the Europe.  
7.2 CONCLUSION 
First of all, let’s answer step by step the initial hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Brexit’s vote was bad news for the European Union in short term period 
Absolutely, the initial hypothesis of Fama (1970) can be confirmed that bad news has a negative 
effect in the stock markets. In all cases of CARi (-1, +1), CARi (-2, +2) and CARi (-3, +3) it 
is negative, expect Slovakia, which means one out of twenty-eight countries. The day of the 
event is not that clear as there are seven countries with positive Abnormal Returns (Slovakia, 
Latvia, Denmark, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Sweden) and the last two were on significant 
level as well, but in both cases the next there were a sharp drop. Although because of these 
countries, the hypothesis 2 becomes even more interesting to evaluate. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a semi strong-form efficient market hypothesis. 
There is not Inside/Private Information regarding the referendum 
That is a hard Hypothesis to reject with certainty. In first place, general election in the past 
have shown that were the only event studies with characteristics and signs of semi-strong 
market, as the stock market reflect significant the information after the event, but the problem 
is that they are not accurate (Justin Robinson & Prosper Bangwayo-Skeete,2008). The rest of 
event studies with different themes are for sure not even semi-strong.  In our case, we confident 
that we can team our case with the general elections event studies, there is a lot of significance 
change according to new information but not on point, and is a highly political issue that affect 
policies and domain and international relations.  
This hypothesis also, is the main reason for our robustness test, in order to identify if there is 
any significant movement towards the upcoming drop. In the other way around, there were 
cases that the significance was in the other way before the event. That means that not only there 
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is not private information from the investors, so they can outperform it, but the public opinion 
was wrong. So, that causes a chain of reactions, the stock markets that bet to Brexit had the 
minimum loss and the smallest percentage change in abnormal returns. In the regression for 
the reasons behind that specific results, the days before the event as variable was highly 
significant with negative sign, as much as the level of debt, which means the market is not 
efficient. 
 
Hypothesis 3: U.K. affected more than any other European country 
That was the most unexpected information from the results. Not only United Kingdom was not 
affected the most, but there are the four same countries (Ireland, Greece, Italy, Spain) in every 
way of comparison (CAARi and ARi). The country of the event and the country of bad news 
is not in the first place of this ranking and this create a numerous of questions.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Euro protects the countries of its use 
In our specialized comparisons between Eurozone and Non-Eurozone had similar results, but 
in the details the non-Eurozone countries won the race. So, we cannot accept this hypothesis, 
as the euro seems more fragile in macroeconomic uncertainty. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The level of influence affected accordingly of the level of debt of each country 
Debt was, is and will be one of the most crucial indicators for economic stability and 
negotiation power. So, in a situation that both, politics and trade, shook up, we would have 
expected to be the most important reason of change, but no, we find out from the regression 
analysis that Debt/GDP came third in significance, behind openness with United Kingdom and 
the winner, the performance before the day of the event.  
 
Let’s answer the title of this paper: Who was worst off? 
We believed that was a battle between the United Kingdom and European Union as a unit, but 
no. Ireland is worst off the United Kingdom from the European Union, and we establish that 
PIIGS are the most fragile countries, in any kind of uncertainty creation in the European Union. 
So, in the end the countries that are in relative better place, are the ones with low level of 
debt, their trade balance is well diversified (not heavily committed to one country) and 
doesn’t act prematurely affected from the media and public trends. 
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7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
There is plenty of room for future researches in five levels.  
At first, the short-term event study can provide crucial information for the trend of the period 
after the event. Here there is room to find out, how much is the significant period of influence 
of the results and from what variables every country or business depends on that significance. 
That was a result from our second Limitation: The time of the event, there is the assumption 
that the only significant event that influence the stock markets is the one that we research for. 
Secondly, a long-term event study can be conducted regarding the Brexit and observe if the 
results are similar with ours. In that level, can be a research about the relation between the 
financial markets and the political announcement from the United Kingdom and its 
macroeconomic performance of the country. 
Our inspiration and the future papers should start from our Limitation: We occupied with the 
stock markets of European Union, not of all around the globe 
The third level is about the broad range of countries that can be selected to analyze. We focused 
in the European Union and the regional union inside of it. The future research can do the same 
methodology for all countries of the globe. After that due to a lot of calculations, it is better to 
focus in countries of G20 (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South 
Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union) or G7 (Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) and of course after 
that in countries and to the largest public companies of the world according to market 
capitalization (Financial Times Global 500) and after that, individually to some notable 
companies like Apple or Amazon or Facebook. 
As an extension of the above, there is a key information that can be turned into a scientific 
paper and an investment decision afterwards according to the results. The paper will be about 
the companies that affected the less after a significant macroeconomic or political event in 
domain and global perspective. If the reasons of that “no effect” company is due to strong 
fundamental ratios will be an investment with low market beta or even a negative one, which 
mean low volatility, and if not, what are the reasons behind that movement.  
Another type of research can be conducted is about connecting the proper way of methodology 
of event studies according to the nature of the event (political, M&A, stock splits, earnings, 
losses etc.).  
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9 APPENDIX 
9.1 DATA 
Table 1.1. 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
ID Country Status Blomberg Index Ticker 
1 Austria Eurozone ATX Index 
2 Belgium Eurozone BEL20 Index 
3 Bulgaria Non-Eurozone SOFIX Index 
4 Croatia Non-Eurozone CRO Index 
5 Cyprus Eurozone CYSMMAPA Index 
6 Czech Republic Non-Eurozone PX Index 
7 Denmark Non-Eurozone KFX Index 
8 Estonia Eurozone TALSE Index 
9 Finland Eurozone HEX Index 
10 France Eurozone CAC Index 
11 Germany Eurozone DAX Index 
12 Greece Eurozone ASE Index 
13 Hungary Non-Eurozone BUX Index 
14 Ireland Eurozone ISEQ Index 
15 Italy Eurozone FTSEMIB Index 
16 Latvia Eurozone RIGSE Index 
17 Lithuania Eurozone VILSE Index 
18 Luxembourg Eurozone LUXXX Index 
19 Malta Eurozone MALTEX Index 
20 Netherlands Eurozone AEX Index 
21 Poland Non-Eurozone WIG20 Index 
22 Portugal Eurozone PSI20 Index 
23 Romania Non-Eurozone BET Index 
24 Slovakia Eurozone SKSM Index 
25 Slovenia Eurozone SBITOP Index 
26 Spain Eurozone IBEX Index 
27 Sweden Non-Eurozone OMX Index 
28 United Kingdom Non-Eurozone UKX Index 
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Table 1.2. 
ARi at t=0 Ordering 
ID Country Status Blomberg Index 
Ticker 
Ari at 
t=0 
tARi SIGN? 
26 Greece Eurozone ASE Index -
11.42% 
-5.375 YES 
15 Spain Eurozone IBEX Index -9.12% -9.819 YES 
28 Italy Eurozone FTSEMIB Index -8.74% -7.077 YES 
14 Ireland Eurozone ISEQ Index -5.07% -5.867 YES 
12 United Kingdom Non-Eurozone UKX Index -4.56% -5.970 YES 
10 France Eurozone CAC Index -4.31% -5.227 YES 
2 Poland Non-Eurozone WIG20 Index -3.96% -3.321 YES 
1 Austria Eurozone ATX Index -3.87% -4.234 YES 
5 Portugal Eurozone PSI20 Index -3.73% -3.588 YES 
22 Hungary Non-Eurozone BUX Index -3.45% -3.403 YES 
11 Belgium Eurozone BEL20 Index -3.39% -4.582 YES 
13 Luxembourg Eurozone LUXXX Index -3.32% -2.748 YES 
21 Cyprus Eurozone CYSMMAPA Index -3.28% -4.170 YES 
18 Germany Eurozone DAX Index -3.10% -3.418 YES 
0 European Union Both - -2.59% -2.696 YES 
6 Romania Non-Eurozone BET Index -2.27% -2.468 YES 
20 Czech Republic Non-Eurozone PX Index -2.19% -2.666 YES 
23 Netherlands Eurozone AEX Index -1.97% -2.522 YES 
25 Slovenia Eurozone SBITOP Index -1.47% -2.188 YES 
4 Croatia Non-Eurozone CRO Index -1.02% -2.066 YES 
19 Bulgaria Non-Eurozone SOFIX Index -0.65% -1.229 NO 
3 Malta Eurozone MALTEX Index -0.58% -1.465 NO 
24 Slovakia Eurozone SKSM Index 0.01% 0.014 NO 
16 Latvia Eurozone RIGSE Index 0.05% 0.038 NO 
7 Denmark Non-Eurozone KFX Index 0.21% 0.203 NO 
8 Lithuania Eurozone VILSE Index 0.54% 1.293 NO 
17 Estonia Eurozone TALSE Index 0.71% 1.179 NO 
9 Finland Eurozone HEX Index 3.36% 4.093 YES 
27 Sweden Non-Eurozone OMX Index 4.11% 4.226 YES 
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Table 1.3. 
CARi (-1, +1) Ordering 
ID Country Status Blomberg Index 
Ticker 
CARi (-1, 
+1) 
tCARi SIGN? 
14 Ireland Eurozone ISEQ Index -14.05% -9.395 YES 
12 Greece Eurozone ASE Index -13.06% -3.548 YES 
15 Italy Eurozone FTSEMIB Index -8.64% -4.043 YES 
26 Spain Eurozone IBEX Index -8.46% -5.258 YES 
28 United 
Kingdom 
Non-Eurozone UKX Index -8.15% -6.163 YES 
1 Austria Eurozone ATX Index -7.03% -4.440 YES 
2 Belgium Eurozone BEL20 Index -6.02% -4.698 YES 
18 Luxembourg Eurozone LUXXX Index -5.43% -2.593 YES 
6 Czech Republic Non-Eurozone PX Index -5.34% -3.758 YES 
10 France Eurozone CAC Index -5.06% -3.541 YES 
27 Sweden Non-Eurozone OMX Index -4.99% -2.961 YES 
0 European Union Both - -4.39% -2.640 YES 
5 Cyprus Eurozone CYSMMAPA 
Index 
-4.37% -3.211 YES 
13 Hungary Non-Eurozone BUX Index -4.30% -2.444 YES 
22 Portugal Eurozone PSI20 Index -4.27% -2.374 YES 
11 Germany Eurozone DAX Index -4.02% -2.559 YES 
9 Finland Eurozone HEX Index -3.91% -2.751 YES 
21 Poland Non-Eurozone WIG20 Index -3.63% -1.760 NO 
20 Netherlands Eurozone AEX Index -2.75% -2.040 YES 
23 Romania Non-Eurozone BET Index -1.75% -1.094 NO 
16 Latvia Eurozone RIGSE Index -1.59% -0.745 NO 
25 Slovenia Eurozone SBITOP Index -1.48% -1.268 NO 
7 Denmark Non-Eurozone KFX Index -1.40% -0.789 NO 
4 Croatia Non-Eurozone CRO Index -1.27% -1.492 NO 
17 Lithuania Eurozone VILSE Index -1.22% -1.677 NO 
8 Estonia Eurozone TALSE Index -1.11% -1.061 NO 
3 Bulgaria Non-Eurozone SOFIX Index -0.93% -1.009 NO 
19 Malta Eurozone MALTEX Index -0.25% -0.369 NO 
24 Slovakia Eurozone SKSM Index 1.61% 0.891 NO 
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9.2 NATIONAL MARKET INDICES 
Table 2.1. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -7.03% -4.440 YES CARi (-3, -1) 1.07% 0.524 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -5.28% -2.583 YES CARi (-5, -1) 4.27% 2.087 YES 
CARi (-3, +3) -4.89% -2.021 YES CARi (-10, -1) 0.29% 0.144 NO 
1. Austria 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.48% 0.520 NO -7.29% -1.739 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.50% 0.550 NO -7.76% -1.898 NO 
8 7/6/2016 0.44% 0.476 NO -8.27% -2.073 YES 
7 7/5/2016 -2.26% -2.474 YES -8.70% -2.242 YES 
6 7/4/2016 -1.01% -1.104 NO -6.44% -1.707 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.47% 0.517 NO -5.43% -1.484 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.23% -0.256 NO -5.90% -1.666 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.70% 0.762 NO -5.67% -1.656 NO 
2 6/28/2016 0.79% 0.867 NO -6.37% -1.930 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -3.58% -3.915 YES -7.16% -2.259 YES 
0 6/24/2016 -3.87% -4.234 YES -3.58% -1.179 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.42% 0.459 NO 0.29% 0.102 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.96% 1.048 NO -0.12% -0.045 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.31% -0.334 NO -1.08% -0.419 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 1.17% 1.275 NO -0.78% -0.321 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 2.03% 2.218 YES -1.94% -0.868 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -1.42% -1.549 NO -3.97% -1.943 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 1.15% 1.255 NO -2.56% -1.397 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.57% -1.714 NO -3.70% -2.338 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 -1.09% -1.187 NO -2.14% -1.651 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.05% -1.148 NO -1.05% -1.148 NO 
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Table 2.2. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -6.02% -4.698 YES CARi (-3, -1) 0.75% 0.455 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -4.68% -2.830 YES CARi (-5, -1) 3.42% 2.068 YES 
CARi (-3, +3) -3.63% -1.854 NO CARi (-10, -1) -0.82% -0.496 NO 
2. Belgium 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.89% 1.208 NO -6.09% -1.796 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.18% 0.243 NO -6.98% -2.110 YES 
8 7/6/2016 -0.94% -1.266 NO -7.16% -2.221 YES 
7 7/5/2016 -1.18% -1.589 NO -6.23% -1.983 YES 
6 7/4/2016 -0.79% -1.063 NO -5.05% -1.655 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.60% 0.813 NO -4.26% -1.441 NO 
4 6/30/2016 0.34% 0.456 NO -4.87% -1.698 NO 
3 6/29/2016 1.09% 1.477 NO -5.20% -1.879 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.02% 1.377 NO -6.30% -2.360 YES 
1 6/27/2016 -3.10% -4.195 YES -7.32% -2.854 YES 
0 6/24/2016 -3.39% -4.582 YES -4.21% -1.716 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.47% 0.640 NO -0.82% -0.351 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.32% 0.431 NO -1.29% -0.583 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.04% -0.053 NO -1.61% -0.771 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 1.50% 2.022 YES -1.57% -0.804 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 1.17% 1.583 NO -3.07% -1.694 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.78% -1.060 NO -4.24% -2.564 YES 
-7 6/15/2016 0.21% 0.283 NO -3.46% -2.336 YES 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.37% -1.845 NO -3.67% -2.861 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 -1.00% -1.352 NO -2.30% -2.199 YES 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.30% -1.758 NO -1.30% -1.758 NO 
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Table 2.3. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -0.93% -1.009 NO CARi (-3, -1) 0.65% 0.550 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -0.58% -0.483 NO CARi (-5, -1) 0.86% 0.723 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) -1.26% -0.895 NO CARi (-10, -1) 2.82% 2.367 YES 
3. Bulgaria 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 -0.80% -1.509 NO 0.75% 0.309 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.29% 0.546 NO 1.56% 0.654 NO 
8 7/6/2016 0.43% 0.799 NO 1.27% 0.546 NO 
7 7/5/2016 0.20% 0.381 NO 0.84% 0.372 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.84% -1.586 NO 0.64% 0.291 NO 
5 7/1/2016 -0.21% -0.398 NO 1.48% 0.696 NO 
4 6/30/2016 0.79% 1.485 NO 1.69% 0.822 NO 
3 6/29/2016 -0.74% -1.381 NO 0.90% 0.454 NO 
2 6/28/2016 -0.16% -0.305 NO 1.64% 0.854 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -0.36% -0.681 NO 1.80% 0.977 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -0.65% -1.229 NO 2.16% 1.226 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.09% 0.161 NO 2.82% 1.674 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.52% 0.974 NO 2.73% 1.711 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 0.05% 0.094 NO 2.21% 1.470 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.18% 0.347 NO 2.16% 1.536 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.02% 0.041 NO 1.98% 1.518 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 0.60% 1.130 NO 1.96% 1.644 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 1.77% 3.321 YES 1.36% 1.273 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -0.43% -0.799 NO -
0.41% 
-0.447 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 0.86% 1.613 NO 0.01% 0.017 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -0.85% -1.588 NO -
0.85% 
-1.588 NO 
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Table 2.4. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -1.27% -1.492 NO CARi (-3, -1) -0.30% -0.272 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -0.61% -0.557 NO CARi (-5, -1) -0.48% -0.439 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) -1.02% -0.785 NO CARi (-10, -1) -0.96% -0.875 NO 
4. Croatia 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.40% 0.804 NO 1.96% 0.869 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.99% 2.008 YES 1.56% 0.711 NO 
8 7/6/2016 0.37% 0.744 NO 0.57% 0.268 NO 
7 7/5/2016 0.75% 1.533 NO 0.21% 0.100 NO 
6 7/4/2016 0.36% 0.726 NO -0.54% -0.269 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.46% 0.932 NO -0.90% -0.459 NO 
4 6/30/2016 0.32% 0.659 NO -1.36% -0.714 NO 
3 6/29/2016 -0.23% -0.467 NO -1.68% -0.915 NO 
2 6/28/2016 0.59% 1.202 NO -1.45% -0.820 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -0.07% -0.137 NO -2.05% -1.201 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -1.02% -2.066 YES -1.98% -1.213 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 -0.19% -0.381 NO -0.96% -0.619 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.07% 0.137 NO -0.77% -0.525 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.18% -0.365 NO -0.84% -0.605 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.05% 0.098 NO -0.66% -0.509 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 -0.23% -0.470 NO -0.71% -0.590 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.13% -0.267 NO -0.48% -0.436 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 -0.33% -0.679 NO -0.35% -0.354 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 0.21% 0.418 NO -0.01% -0.017 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 0.02% 0.047 NO -0.22% -0.316 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -0.24% -0.494 NO -0.24% -0.494 NO 
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Table 2.5. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -4.37% -3.211 YES CARi (-3, -1) -0.55% -0.315 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -4.07% -2.319 YES CARi (-5, -1) 0.19% 0.106 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) -4.62% -2.223 YES CARi (-10, -1) -1.52% -0.864 NO 
5. Cyprus 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.86% 1.098 NO -6.10% -1.693 NO 
9 7/7/2016 -1.31% -1.666 NO -6.96% -1.980 YES 
8 7/6/2016 -0.09% -0.109 NO -5.65% -1.650 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -0.67% -0.857 NO -5.57% -1.669 NO 
6 7/4/2016 0.34% 0.439 NO -4.89% -1.510 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.20% 0.254 NO -5.24% -1.666 NO 
4 6/30/2016 0.15% 0.193 NO -5.44% -1.786 NO 
3 6/29/2016 -1.27% -1.621 NO -5.59% -1.900 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.11% 1.406 NO -4.31% -1.522 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -0.62% -0.794 NO -5.42% -1.990 YES 
0 6/24/2016 -3.28% -4.170 YES -4.79% -1.840 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 -0.47% -0.599 NO -1.52% -0.611 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 -0.81% -1.029 NO -1.05% -0.444 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 0.73% 0.924 NO -0.24% -0.108 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 -0.08% -0.098 NO -0.97% -0.464 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.82% 1.037 NO -0.89% -0.462 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.30% -0.377 NO -1.70% -0.970 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.10% 0.131 NO -1.41% -0.895 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 0.35% 0.447 NO -1.51% -1.109 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -2.02% -2.566 YES -1.86% -1.675 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 0.15% 0.197 NO 0.15% 0.197 NO 
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Table 2.6. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -5.34% -3.758 YES CARi (-3, -1) 1.12% 0.608 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -2.68% -1.460 NO CARi (-5, -1) 2.99% 1.631 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) -3.48% -1.602 NO CARi (-10, -1) -1.52% -0.827 NO 
6. Czech Republic 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 -1.01% -1.234 NO -6.26% -1.665 NO 
9 7/7/2016 -1.63% -1.989 YES -5.25% -1.430 NO 
8 7/6/2016 0.41% 0.499 NO -3.62% -1.011 NO 
7 7/5/2016 0.35% 0.424 NO -4.03% -1.156 NO 
6 7/4/2016 0.42% 0.506 NO -4.38% -1.293 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.78% 0.950 NO -4.79% -1.459 NO 
4 6/30/2016 0.54% 0.662 NO -5.57% -1.752 NO 
3 6/29/2016 -0.75% -0.911 NO -6.12% -1.991 YES 
2 6/28/2016 1.25% 1.526 NO -5.37% -1.813 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -2.91% -3.548 YES -6.62% -2.327 YES 
0 6/24/2016 -2.19% -2.666 YES -3.71% -1.361 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 -0.24% -0.296 NO -1.52% -0.585 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 1.41% 1.720 NO -1.28% -0.518 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.05% -0.064 NO -2.69% -1.157 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.13% 0.160 NO -2.63% -1.213 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 1.75% 2.127 YES -2.77% -1.375 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.08% -0.093 NO -4.51% -2.458 YES 
-7 6/15/2016 0.92% 1.116 NO -4.44% -2.701 YES 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.03% -1.249 NO -5.35% -3.763 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 -1.76% -2.146 YES -4.33% -3.726 YES 
-10 6/10/2016 -2.56% -3.124 YES -2.56% -3.124 YES 
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Table 2.7. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -1.40% -0.789 NO CARi (-3, -1) 1.38% 0.602 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) 0.69% 0.303 NO CARi (-5, -1) 2.49% 1.087 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) 1.48% 0.546 NO CARi (-10, -1) -3.99% -1.744 NO 
7. Denmark 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 -0.11% -0.104 NO -4.22% -0.900 NO 
9 7/7/2016 1.25% 1.224 NO -4.12% -0.899 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -1.59% -1.549 NO -5.37% -1.203 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -0.98% -0.954 NO -3.78% -0.871 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.25% -0.246 NO -2.81% -0.665 NO 
5 7/1/2016 1.40% 1.363 NO -2.56% -0.624 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.06% -0.056 NO -3.95% -0.996 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.88% 0.863 NO -3.89% -1.016 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.04% 1.016 NO -4.78% -1.294 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -2.03% -1.985 YES -5.82% -1.640 NO 
0 6/24/2016 0.21% 0.203 NO -3.79% -1.114 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.43% 0.415 NO -3.99% -1.233 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 1.05% 1.028 NO -4.42% -1.438 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.10% -0.096 NO -5.47% -1.889 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.71% 0.694 NO -5.37% -1.983 YES 
-5 6/17/2016 0.40% 0.390 NO -6.08% -2.425 YES 
-6 6/16/2016 -1.85% -1.809 NO -6.48% -2.831 YES 
-7 6/15/2016 0.47% 0.458 NO -4.63% -2.261 YES 
-8 6/14/2016 -3.31% -3.230 YES -5.10% -2.875 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 0.18% 0.180 NO -1.79% -1.237 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.98% -1.930 NO -1.98% -1.930 NO 
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Table 2.8. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -1.11% -1.061 NO CARi (-3, -1) 0.47% 0.347 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) 0.79% 0.589 NO CARi (-5, -1) -1.02% -0.755 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) 1.71% 1.074 NO CARi (-10, -1) -3.41% -2.533 YES 
8. Estonia 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 -0.09% -0.142 NO -2.04% -0.739 NO 
9 7/7/2016 -0.39% -0.645 NO -1.95% -0.726 NO 
8 7/6/2016 0.56% 0.930 NO -1.57% -0.597 NO 
7 7/5/2016 0.17% 0.287 NO -2.13% -0.832 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.05% -0.077 NO -2.30% -0.926 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.07% 0.119 NO -2.25% -0.935 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.16% -0.260 NO -2.32% -0.997 NO 
3 6/29/2016 1.04% 1.728 NO -2.17% -0.962 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.04% 1.733 NO -3.21% -1.478 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -1.55% -2.575 YES -4.25% -2.038 YES 
0 6/24/2016 0.71% 1.179 NO -2.70% -1.352 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 -0.27% -0.442 NO -3.41% -1.791 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.86% 1.423 NO -3.14% -1.741 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.12% -0.205 NO -4.00% -2.349 YES 
-4 6/20/2016 -1.20% -1.990 YES -3.88% -2.434 YES 
-5 6/17/2016 -0.29% -0.474 NO -2.68% -1.817 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -1.89% -3.146 YES -2.39% -1.778 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 -0.80% -1.326 NO -0.50% -0.415 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 0.02% 0.026 NO 0.30% 0.287 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 0.87% 1.449 NO 0.28% 0.333 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -0.59% -0.978 NO -0.59% -0.978 NO 
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Table 2.9. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -3.91% -2.751 YES CARi (-3, -1) 0.09% 0.049 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -1.68% -0.917 NO CARi (-5, -1) 1.78% 0.967 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) -1.30% -0.598 NO CARi (-10, -1) -0.69% -0.374 NO 
9. Finland 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.77% 0.940 NO -1.87% -0.497 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.29% 0.356 NO -2.64% -0.719 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -0.41% -0.501 NO -2.93% -0.820 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -1.69% -2.053 YES -2.52% -0.724 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.74% -0.903 NO -0.84% -0.247 NO 
5 7/1/2016 1.67% 2.027 YES -0.09% -0.029 NO 
4 6/30/2016 0.32% 0.386 NO -1.76% -0.553 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.84% 1.028 NO -2.08% -0.676 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.47% 1.791 NO -2.92% -0.986 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -7.07% -8.604 YES -4.39% -1.544 NO 
0 6/24/2016 3.36% 4.093 YES 2.68% 0.982 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 -0.21% -0.253 NO -0.69% -0.264 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.76% 0.924 NO -0.48% -0.194 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.46% -0.561 NO -1.24% -0.533 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 1.51% 1.843 NO -0.78% -0.357 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.17% 0.210 NO -2.29% -1.138 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -1.18% -1.438 NO -2.46% -1.341 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.72% 0.882 NO -1.28% -0.780 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.19% -1.451 NO -2.01% -1.410 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.20% -0.247 NO -0.81% -0.701 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -0.61% -0.744 NO -0.61% -0.744 NO 
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Table 2.10. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -5.06% -3.541 YES CARi (-3, -1) 1.48% 0.804 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -3.16% -1.712 NO CARi (-5, -1) 4.07% 2.204 YES 
CARi (-3, +3) -2.76% -1.264 NO CARi (-10, -1) 1.34% 0.728 NO 
10. France 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.54% 0.655 NO -4.76% -1.260 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.21% 0.249 NO -5.30% -1.438 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -1.20% -1.450 NO -5.51% -1.532 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -1.11% -1.348 NO -4.31% -1.232 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.90% -1.086 NO -3.20% -0.941 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.95% 1.156 NO -2.30% -0.698 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.36% -0.435 NO -3.26% -1.020 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.56% 0.684 NO -2.90% -0.939 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.18% 1.435 NO -3.46% -1.164 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -1.68% -2.034 YES -4.65% -1.626 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -4.31% -5.227 YES -2.97% -1.085 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.93% 1.127 NO 1.34% 0.515 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.72% 0.871 NO 0.41% 0.167 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.17% -0.201 NO -0.31% -0.131 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 1.92% 2.327 YES -0.14% -0.064 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.66% 0.803 NO -2.06% -1.019 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.27% -0.325 NO -2.72% -1.476 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.71% 0.862 NO -2.45% -1.488 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.74% -2.112 YES -3.17% -2.215 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.33% -0.402 NO -1.42% -1.220 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.09% -1.323 NO -1.09% -1.323 NO 
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Table 2.11. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -4.02% -2.559 YES CARi (-3, -1) 1.59% 0.785 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -2.50% -1.235 NO CARi (-5, -1) 4.01% 1.980 YES 
CARi (-3, +3) -2.95% -1.230 NO CARi (-10, -1) 1.63% 0.802 NO 
11. Germany 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 1.03% 1.137 NO -4.45% -1.071 NO 
9 7/7/2016 -0.09% -0.099 NO -5.48% -1.352 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -1.01% -1.110 NO -5.39% -1.364 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -1.26% -1.392 NO -4.38% -1.140 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.67% -0.736 NO -3.12% -0.836 NO 
5 7/1/2016 1.08% 1.191 NO -2.46% -0.677 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.62% -0.687 NO -3.54% -1.007 NO 
3 6/29/2016 -0.23% -0.249 NO -2.91% -0.859 NO 
2 6/28/2016 0.55% 0.603 NO -2.69% -0.822 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -1.76% -1.944 NO -3.23% -1.030 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -3.10% -3.418 YES -1.47% -0.490 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.84% 0.930 NO 1.63% 0.567 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.97% 1.067 NO 0.78% 0.288 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.22% -0.242 NO -0.18% -0.072 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 1.89% 2.084 YES 0.04% 0.015 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.53% 0.590 NO -1.85% -0.835 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.41% -0.458 NO -2.39% -1.178 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.64% 0.704 NO -1.97% -1.089 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -0.89% -0.977 NO -2.61% -1.664 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.32% -0.355 NO -1.73% -1.347 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.40% -1.549 NO -1.40% -1.549 NO 
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Table 2.12. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -13.06% -3.548 YES CARi (-3, -1) 4.30% 0.905 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -9.48% -1.996 YES CARi (-5, -1) 8.30% 1.747 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) -7.19% -1.279 NO CARi (-10, -1) -4.07% -0.857 NO 
12. Greece 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.18% 0.085 NO -17.46% -1.793 NO 
9 7/7/2016 -0.01% -0.007 NO -17.64% -1.856 NO 
8 7/6/2016 1.02% 0.478 NO -17.62% -1.903 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -1.91% -0.897 NO -18.64% -2.067 YES 
6 7/4/2016 -0.86% -0.404 NO -16.73% -1.910 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.59% 0.279 NO -15.87% -1.867 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.90% -0.425 NO -16.46% -2.001 YES 
3 6/29/2016 -0.82% -0.386 NO -15.56% -1.957 NO 
2 6/28/2016 2.68% 1.260 NO -14.74% -1.924 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -1.92% -0.905 NO -17.42% -2.366 YES 
0 6/24/2016 -11.42% -5.375 YES -15.49% -2.199 YES 
-1 6/23/2016 0.29% 0.136 NO -4.07% -0.606 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.89% 0.421 NO -4.36% -0.684 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 3.12% 1.466 NO -5.26% -0.874 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 -1.07% -0.503 NO -8.37% -1.489 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 5.07% 2.387 YES -7.30% -1.403 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -3.20% -1.505 NO -12.37% -2.604 YES 
-7 6/15/2016 -3.24% -1.523 NO -9.18% -2.159 YES 
-8 6/14/2016 0.26% 0.123 NO -5.94% -1.614 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -2.82% -1.327 NO -6.20% -2.064 YES 
-10 6/10/2016 -3.38% -1.592 NO -3.38% -1.592 NO 
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Table 2.13. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -4.30% -2.444 YES CARi (-3, -1) -0.27% -0.117 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -1.71% -0.754 NO CARi (-5, -1) 1.76% 0.775 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) -2.35% -0.875 NO CARi (-10, -1) -2.56% -1.130 NO 
13. Hungary 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 -0.42% -0.409 NO -3.35% -0.720 NO 
9 7/7/2016 1.84% 1.817 NO -2.93% -0.646 NO 
8 7/6/2016 0.48% 0.473 NO -4.78% -1.080 NO 
7 7/5/2016 0.97% 0.956 NO -5.26% -1.221 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.24% -0.235 NO -6.23% -1.488 NO 
5 7/1/2016 -0.75% -0.740 NO -5.99% -1.475 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.59% -0.581 NO -5.24% -1.333 NO 
3 6/29/2016 -0.47% -0.460 NO -4.65% -1.224 NO 
2 6/28/2016 2.68% 2.639 YES -4.18% -1.143 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -0.84% -0.829 NO -6.86% -1.951 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -3.45% -3.403 YES -6.02% -1.788 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.00% -0.001 NO -2.56% -0.799 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 -0.09% -0.092 NO -2.56% -0.842 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.17% -0.168 NO -2.47% -0.861 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.60% 0.594 NO -2.30% -0.856 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 1.42% 1.401 NO -2.90% -1.167 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -1.87% -1.846 NO -4.32% -1.905 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 1.47% 1.449 NO -2.45% -1.207 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -0.16% -0.156 NO -3.92% -2.230 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 -2.39% -2.359 YES -3.76% -2.622 YES 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.37% -1.349 NO -1.37% -1.349 NO 
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Table 2.14. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -14.05% -9.395 YES CARi (-3, -1) 0.56% 0.292 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -11.48% -5.945 YES CARi (-5, -1) 5.11% 2.648 YES 
CARi (-3, +3) -11.21% -4.908 YES CARi (-10, -1) -0.22% -0.112 NO 
14. Ireland 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.60% 0.695 NO -13.72% -3.469 YES 
9 7/7/2016 0.79% 0.921 NO -14.32% -3.710 YES 
8 7/6/2016 -1.29% -1.493 NO -15.12% -4.017 YES 
7 7/5/2016 -2.24% -2.593 YES -13.83% -3.776 YES 
6 7/4/2016 -1.43% -1.654 NO -11.59% -3.256 YES 
5 7/1/2016 1.92% 2.221 YES -10.16% -2.943 YES 
4 6/30/2016 -0.09% -0.103 NO -12.08% -3.613 YES 
3 6/29/2016 1.04% 1.209 NO -11.99% -3.712 YES 
2 6/28/2016 1.71% 1.980 YES -13.04% -4.187 YES 
1 6/27/2016 -9.46% -10.960 YES -14.75% -4.930 YES 
0 6/24/2016 -5.07% -5.867 YES -5.28% -1.844 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.48% 0.554 NO -0.22% -0.079 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.86% 0.999 NO -0.70% -0.268 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.78% -0.900 NO -1.56% -0.638 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 3.27% 3.792 YES -0.78% -0.341 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 1.28% 1.477 NO -4.05% -1.917 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -1.67% -1.930 NO -5.33% -2.760 YES 
-7 6/15/2016 0.20% 0.227 NO -3.66% -2.121 YES 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.41% -1.633 NO -3.86% -2.580 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 -1.22% -1.412 NO -2.45% -2.005 YES 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.23% -1.424 NO -1.23% -1.424 NO 
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Table 2.15. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -8.64% -4.043 YES CARi (-3, -1) 2.12% 0.767 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -6.99% -2.534 YES CARi (-5, -1) 6.12% 2.217 YES 
CARi (-3, +3) -7.35% -2.250 YES CARi (-10, -1) 1.66% 0.600 NO 
15. Italy 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 2.70% 2.190 YES -8.64% -1.527 NO 
9 7/7/2016 -0.52% -0.422 NO -11.34% -2.055 YES 
8 7/6/2016 -1.45% -1.176 NO -10.82% -2.011 YES 
7 7/5/2016 -0.75% -0.607 NO -9.37% -1.789 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -1.68% -1.357 NO -8.62% -1.694 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.76% 0.619 NO -6.95% -1.407 NO 
4 6/30/2016 0.10% 0.081 NO -7.71% -1.613 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.01% 0.005 NO -7.81% -1.691 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.74% 1.411 NO -7.82% -1.756 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -2.48% -2.008 YES -9.56% -2.235 YES 
0 6/24/2016 -8.74% -7.077 YES -7.08% -1.729 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 2.57% 2.082 YES 1.66% 0.424 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 -0.09% -0.074 NO -0.91% -0.247 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.36% -0.293 NO -0.82% -0.236 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.87% 0.701 NO -0.46% -0.141 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 3.14% 2.541 YES -1.33% -0.439 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.73% -0.594 NO -4.46% -1.617 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 1.22% 0.988 NO -3.73% -1.511 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.44% -1.166 NO -4.95% -2.315 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 -1.19% -0.962 NO -3.51% -2.010 YES 
-10 6/10/2016 -2.32% -1.881 NO -2.32% -1.881 NO 
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Table 2.16. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -1.59% -0.745 NO CARi (-3, -1) -1.87% -0.677 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -3.11% -1.126 NO CARi (-5, -1) -1.40% -0.508 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) -3.16% -0.968 NO CARi (-10, -1) -3.70% -1.341 NO 
16. Latvia 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 -0.23% -0.188 NO -4.33% -0.765 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.44% 0.358 NO -4.09% -0.742 NO 
8 7/6/2016 0.66% 0.535 NO -4.54% -0.843 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -2.01% -1.627 NO -5.20% -0.993 NO 
6 7/4/2016 1.47% 1.189 NO -3.19% -0.627 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.59% 0.477 NO -4.66% -0.943 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.25% -0.204 NO -5.25% -1.098 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.03% 0.026 NO -4.99% -1.081 NO 
2 6/28/2016 0.07% 0.055 NO -5.02% -1.129 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -1.44% -1.167 NO -5.09% -1.191 NO 
0 6/24/2016 0.05% 0.038 NO -3.65% -0.893 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 -0.20% -0.162 NO -3.70% -0.948 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 -1.58% -1.282 NO -3.50% -0.946 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.09% -0.069 NO -1.92% -0.550 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.25% 0.203 NO -1.83% -0.562 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.22% 0.175 NO -2.08% -0.689 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -1.34% -1.089 NO -2.30% -0.833 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 -0.42% -0.338 NO -0.96% -0.387 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 0.27% 0.216 NO -0.54% -0.252 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.33% -0.264 NO -0.81% -0.462 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -0.48% -0.389 NO -0.48% -0.389 NO 
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Table 2.17. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -1.22% -1.677 NO CARi (-3, -1) -0.19% -0.198 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -0.87% -0.927 NO CARi (-5, -1) -0.02% -0.017 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) -0.28% -0.249 NO CARi (-10, -1) -0.45% -0.483 NO 
17. Lithuania 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.55% 1.306 NO 2.02% 1.045 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.78% 1.846 NO 1.47% 0.778 NO 
8 7/6/2016 0.08% 0.186 NO 0.69% 0.375 NO 
7 7/5/2016 0.81% 1.924 NO 0.61% 0.341 NO 
6 7/4/2016 0.48% 1.130 NO -0.20% -0.116 NO 
5 7/1/2016 -0.40% -0.938 NO -0.68% -0.402 NO 
4 6/30/2016 0.26% 0.626 NO -0.28% -0.172 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.68% 1.626 NO -0.54% -0.346 NO 
2 6/28/2016 0.33% 0.794 NO -1.23% -0.810 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -1.65% -3.927 YES -1.56% -1.072 NO 
0 6/24/2016 0.54% 1.293 NO 0.09% 0.064 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 -0.11% -0.271 NO -0.45% -0.341 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.02% 0.039 NO -0.34% -0.270 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.09% -0.212 NO -0.36% -0.300 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 -0.01% -0.032 NO -0.27% -0.240 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.18% 0.439 NO -0.25% -0.247 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.83% -1.964 YES -0.44% -0.466 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 -0.07% -0.163 NO 0.39% 0.461 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 0.19% 0.450 NO 0.46% 0.626 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 0.04% 0.094 NO 0.27% 0.448 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 0.23% 0.540 NO 0.23% 0.540 NO 
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Table 2.18. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -5.43% -2.593 YES CARi (-3, -1) 0.93% 0.343 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -3.88% -1.434 NO CARi (-5, -1) 3.00% 1.108 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) -5.37% -1.680 NO CARi (-10, -1) 2.55% 0.943 NO 
18. Luxembourg 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 -0.47% -0.391 NO -2.03% -0.366 NO 
9 7/7/2016 -1.38% -1.144 NO -1.55% -0.287 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -0.77% -0.638 NO -0.17% -0.033 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -1.80% -1.488 NO 0.60% 0.117 NO 
6 7/4/2016 2.60% 2.149 YES 2.40% 0.481 NO 
5 7/1/2016 3.95% 3.265 YES -0.20% -0.041 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.39% -0.326 NO -4.15% -0.885 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.11% 0.088 NO -3.75% -0.829 NO 
2 6/28/2016 0.93% 0.765 NO -3.86% -0.885 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -4.01% -3.317 YES -4.78% -1.142 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -3.32% -2.748 YES -0.77% -0.193 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 1.90% 1.573 NO 2.55% 0.667 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.63% 0.519 NO 0.65% 0.178 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -1.60% -1.325 NO 0.02% 0.006 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 -0.57% -0.470 NO 1.62% 0.507 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 2.64% 2.180 YES 2.19% 0.740 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.27% -0.219 NO -0.45% -0.165 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 1.47% 1.217 NO -0.18% -0.075 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.28% -1.060 NO -1.65% -0.789 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.05% -0.038 NO -0.37% -0.216 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -0.32% -0.268 NO -0.32% -0.268 NO 
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Table 2.19. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -0.25% -0.369 NO CARi (-3, -1) 0.66% 0.743 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) 0.99% 1.118 NO CARi (-5, -1) 0.81% 0.918 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) 1.23% 1.175 NO CARi (-10, -1) 1.02% 1.144 NO 
19. Malta 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 -0.23% -0.579 NO 2.14% 1.176 NO 
9 7/7/2016 -0.10% -0.254 NO 2.37% 1.334 NO 
8 7/6/2016 0.15% 0.366 NO 2.47% 1.427 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -0.10% -0.260 NO 2.32% 1.380 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.09% -0.236 NO 2.43% 1.483 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.35% 0.880 NO 2.52% 1.588 NO 
4 6/30/2016 0.58% 1.466 NO 2.17% 1.413 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.00% 0.011 NO 1.59% 1.071 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.24% 3.111 YES 1.59% 1.108 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -0.08% -0.210 NO 0.35% 0.255 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -0.58% -1.465 NO 0.43% 0.330 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.41% 1.035 NO 1.02% 0.809 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.01% 0.028 NO 0.60% 0.508 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 0.24% 0.598 NO 0.59% 0.528 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.19% 0.475 NO 0.36% 0.339 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 -0.03% -0.083 NO 0.17% 0.172 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 0.22% 0.546 NO 0.20% 0.226 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.25% 0.642 NO -0.02% -0.020 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 0.07% 0.165 NO -0.27% -0.394 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.31% -0.777 NO -0.34% -0.599 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -0.03% -0.070 NO -0.03% -0.070 NO 
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Table 2.20. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -2.75% -2.040 YES CARi (-3, -1) 1.67% 0.958 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -2.10% -1.203 NO CARi (-5, -1) 4.08% 2.343 YES 
CARi (-3, +3) -0.94% -0.458 NO CARi (-10, -1) 0.70% 0.401 NO 
20. Netherlands 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.55% 0.706 NO -2.83% -0.794 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.40% 0.513 NO -3.38% -0.971 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -1.27% -1.631 NO -3.78% -1.114 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -0.53% -0.685 NO -2.51% -0.760 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.84% -1.083 NO -1.98% -0.616 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.76% 0.974 NO -1.14% -0.364 NO 
4 6/30/2016 0.02% 0.025 NO -1.89% -0.628 NO 
3 6/29/2016 1.02% 1.312 NO -1.91% -0.656 NO 
2 6/28/2016 0.06% 0.083 NO -2.94% -1.045 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -1.74% -2.227 YES -3.00% -1.112 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -1.97% -2.522 YES -1.27% -0.490 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.95% 1.215 NO 0.70% 0.284 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.59% 0.761 NO -0.25% -0.106 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 0.13% 0.167 NO -0.84% -0.381 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 1.95% 2.507 YES -0.97% -0.470 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.46% 0.590 NO -2.92% -1.532 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.09% -0.115 NO -3.38% -1.942 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 -0.17% -0.221 NO -3.29% -2.114 YES 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.61% -2.072 YES -3.12% -2.313 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.29% -0.368 NO -1.51% -1.368 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.22% -1.566 NO -1.22% -1.566 NO 
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Table 2.21. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -3.63% -1.760 NO CARi (-3, -1) 3.06% 1.148 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -0.94% -0.352 NO CARi (-5, -1) 6.08% 2.281 YES 
CARi (-3, +3) -1.82% -0.578 NO CARi (-10, -1) 2.14% 0.805 NO 
21. Poland 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 -0.77% -0.644 NO -6.01% -1.101 NO 
9 7/7/2016 1.26% 1.059 NO -5.24% -0.984 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -0.83% -0.700 NO -6.51% -1.253 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -0.32% -0.268 NO -5.67% -1.122 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -1.51% -1.265 NO -5.35% -1.090 NO 
5 7/1/2016 -1.21% -1.018 NO -3.85% -0.807 NO 
4 6/30/2016 0.10% 0.087 NO -2.63% -0.570 NO 
3 6/29/2016 -0.76% -0.635 NO -2.74% -0.614 NO 
2 6/28/2016 0.58% 0.491 NO -1.98% -0.461 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -0.75% -0.631 NO -2.57% -0.621 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -3.96% -3.321 YES -1.81% -0.459 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 1.08% 0.904 NO 2.14% 0.569 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 2.11% 1.770 NO 1.07% 0.298 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.13% -0.108 NO -1.04% -0.309 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 1.90% 1.594 NO -0.91% -0.290 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 1.12% 0.940 NO -2.81% -0.964 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -1.83% -1.536 NO -3.93% -1.476 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.72% 0.605 NO -2.10% -0.883 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.12% -0.938 NO -2.82% -1.368 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.17% -0.144 NO -1.71% -1.013 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.54% -1.288 NO -1.54% -1.288 NO 
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Table 2.22. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -4.27% -2.374 YES CARi (-3, -1) -0.55% -0.235 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -2.99% -1.287 NO CARi (-5, -1) 3.24% 1.396 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) -4.18% -1.521 NO CARi (-10, -1) -2.16% -0.931 NO 
22. Portugal 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.53% 0.509 NO -6.73% -1.414 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.73% 0.706 NO -7.26% -1.563 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -0.68% -0.653 NO -8.00% -1.765 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -1.73% -1.668 NO -7.32% -1.660 NO 
6 7/4/2016 0.10% 0.097 NO -5.59% -1.304 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.94% 0.905 NO -5.69% -1.368 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.83% -0.795 NO -6.63% -1.646 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.17% 0.160 NO -5.80% -1.492 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.12% 1.074 NO -5.97% -1.592 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -1.19% -1.145 NO -7.08% -1.968 YES 
0 6/24/2016 -3.73% -3.588 YES -5.89% -1.710 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.64% 0.620 NO -2.16% -0.659 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.17% 0.161 NO -2.81% -0.901 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -1.36% -1.308 NO -2.98% -1.013 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 1.91% 1.836 NO -1.62% -0.588 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 1.88% 1.812 NO -3.53% -1.385 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.71% -0.687 NO -5.41% -2.328 YES 
-7 6/15/2016 -0.20% -0.190 NO -4.70% -2.259 YES 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.83% -1.758 NO -4.50% -2.499 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 -1.54% -1.481 NO -2.67% -1.817 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.13% -1.089 NO -1.13% -1.089 NO 
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Table 2.23. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -1.75% -1.094 NO CARi (-3, -1) 0.24% 0.115 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) 0.70% 0.341 NO CARi (-5, -1) -0.10% -0.050 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) 0.94% 0.387 NO CARi (-10, -1) -0.11% -0.055 NO 
23. Romania 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 -0.27% -0.290 NO 0.11% 0.025 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.46% 0.504 NO 0.37% 0.090 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -0.87% -0.945 NO -0.09% -0.023 NO 
7 7/5/2016 0.61% 0.660 NO 0.78% 0.199 NO 
6 7/4/2016 0.17% 0.186 NO 0.17% 0.045 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.23% 0.255 NO 0.00% 0.000 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.83% -0.899 NO -0.24% -0.066 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.23% 0.248 NO 0.59% 0.172 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.97% 2.141 YES 0.36% 0.110 NO 
1 6/27/2016 0.78% 0.846 NO -1.61% -0.504 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -2.27% -2.468 YES -2.39% -0.781 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 -0.25% -0.274 NO -0.11% -0.039 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.48% 0.518 NO 0.14% 0.050 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 0.01% 0.013 NO -0.34% -0.130 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 -0.57% -0.616 NO -0.35% -0.144 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.23% 0.247 NO 0.22% 0.096 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.79% -0.862 NO -0.01% -0.005 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 1.19% 1.295 NO 0.78% 0.425 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 0.23% 0.255 NO -0.41% -0.257 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 0.61% 0.660 NO -0.64% -0.495 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.25% -1.359 NO -1.25% -1.359 NO 
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Table 2.24. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) 1.61% 0.891 NO CARi (-3, -1) 1.19% 0.513 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) 1.21% 0.521 NO CARi (-5, -1) 1.62% 0.695 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) 0.71% 0.256 NO CARi (-10, -1) -2.99% -1.284 NO 
24. Slovakia 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 -1.20% -1.150 NO -5.99% -1.255 NO 
9 7/7/2016 1.35% 1.298 NO -4.79% -1.029 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -2.48% -2.379 YES -6.14% -1.354 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -0.07% -0.068 NO -3.66% -0.830 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.08% -0.079 NO -3.59% -0.838 NO 
5 7/1/2016 -0.08% -0.078 NO -3.51% -0.844 NO 
4 6/30/2016 0.04% 0.043 NO -3.43% -0.851 NO 
3 6/29/2016 -0.13% -0.122 NO -3.47% -0.892 NO 
2 6/28/2016 -0.32% -0.309 NO -3.35% -0.892 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -0.05% -0.052 NO -3.03% -0.840 NO 
0 6/24/2016 0.01% 0.014 NO -2.97% -0.861 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 1.65% 1.582 NO -2.99% -0.908 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 -0.07% -0.071 NO -4.63% -1.484 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.38% -0.364 NO -4.56% -1.549 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 -0.19% -0.180 NO -4.18% -1.518 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.61% 0.589 NO -3.99% -1.566 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -1.97% -1.897 NO -4.61% -1.979 YES 
-7 6/15/2016 0.33% 0.315 NO -2.63% -1.264 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -2.85% -2.741 YES -2.96% -1.642 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.07% -0.069 NO -0.11% -0.073 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -0.04% -0.034 NO -0.04% -0.034 NO 
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Table 2.25. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -1.48% -1.268 NO CARi (-3, -1) 1.06% 0.705 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) 0.24% 0.157 NO CARi (-5, -1) 1.93% 1.284 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) -0.44% -0.248 NO CARi (-10, -1) 0.70% 0.466 NO 
25. Slovenia 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 -0.46% -0.689 NO 1.83% 0.592 NO 
9 7/7/2016 -0.34% -0.505 NO 2.29% 0.760 NO 
8 7/6/2016 0.93% 1.382 NO 2.63% 0.896 NO 
7 7/5/2016 2.04% 3.035 YES 1.70% 0.595 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.09% -0.130 NO -0.34% -0.124 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.62% 0.928 NO -0.26% -0.096 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.08% -0.120 NO -0.88% -0.338 NO 
3 6/29/2016 -0.45% -0.665 NO -0.80% -0.318 NO 
2 6/28/2016 0.67% 0.988 NO -0.35% -0.146 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -0.25% -0.368 NO -1.02% -0.437 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -1.47% -2.188 YES -0.77% -0.345 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.24% 0.361 NO 0.70% 0.330 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 1.05% 1.558 NO 0.46% 0.227 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.23% -0.343 NO -0.59% -0.310 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.74% 1.106 NO -0.36% -0.201 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.13% 0.190 NO -1.10% -0.669 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.77% -1.137 NO -1.23% -0.818 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.22% 0.321 NO -0.47% -0.346 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -0.74% -1.100 NO -0.68% -0.585 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.25% -0.370 NO 0.06% 0.062 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 0.31% 0.458 NO 0.31% 0.458 NO 
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Table 2.26. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -8.46% -5.258 YES CARi (-3, -1) 1.52% 0.734 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -6.47% -3.116 YES CARi (-5, -1) 5.12% 2.464 YES 
CARi (-3, +3) -5.49% -2.234 YES CARi (-10, -1) 1.78% 0.857 NO 
26. Spain 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 1.05% 1.128 NO -5.63% -1.323 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.50% 0.536 NO -6.68% -1.608 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -1.03% -1.110 NO -7.18% -1.772 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -1.68% -1.806 NO -6.15% -1.559 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.09% -0.093 NO -4.47% -1.166 NO 
5 7/1/2016 1.43% 1.538 NO -4.38% -1.179 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.58% -0.621 NO -5.81% -1.615 NO 
3 6/29/2016 1.46% 1.575 NO -5.23% -1.505 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.12% 1.207 NO -6.70% -1.999 YES 
1 6/27/2016 -0.48% -0.512 NO -7.82% -2.429 YES 
0 6/24/2016 -9.12% -9.819 YES -7.34% -2.382 YES 
-1 6/23/2016 1.14% 1.223 NO 1.78% 0.606 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.87% 0.934 NO 0.65% 0.231 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.48% -0.517 NO -0.22% -0.085 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 1.90% 2.044 YES 0.26% 0.105 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 1.70% 1.824 NO -1.64% -0.721 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.39% -0.425 NO -3.34% -1.606 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 1.29% 1.384 NO -2.94% -1.583 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.54% -1.661 NO -4.23% -2.627 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.66% -0.712 NO -2.68% -2.043 YES 
-10 6/10/2016 -2.02% -2.177 YES -2.02% -2.177 YES 
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Table 2.27. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -4.99% -2.961 YES CARi (-3, -1) 0.66% 0.302 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -2.85% -1.310 NO CARi (-5, -1) 4.02% 1.850 NO 
CARi (-3, +3) -2.34% -0.909 NO CARi (-10, -1) 0.95% 0.437 NO 
27. Sweden 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.39% 0.405 NO -3.26% -0.731 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.56% 0.579 NO -3.65% -0.840 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -0.63% -0.643 NO -4.21% -0.994 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -1.69% -1.740 NO -3.59% -0.870 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -1.14% -1.177 NO -1.90% -0.473 NO 
5 7/1/2016 1.34% 1.379 NO -0.75% -0.194 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.05% -0.050 NO -2.09% -0.556 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.61% 0.629 NO -2.04% -0.562 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.19% 1.226 NO -2.66% -0.758 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -8.90% -9.160 YES -3.85% -1.142 NO 
0 6/24/2016 4.11% 4.226 YES 5.06% 1.569 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 -0.19% -0.194 NO 0.95% 0.309 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.95% 0.974 NO 1.14% 0.390 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.10% -0.104 NO 0.19% 0.070 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 2.24% 2.299 YES 0.29% 0.114 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 1.13% 1.162 NO -1.94% -0.816 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -1.93% -1.990 YES -3.07% -1.413 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 1.55% 1.598 NO -1.14% -0.585 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.07% -1.100 NO -2.69% -1.598 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 0.23% 0.239 NO -1.62% -1.179 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.85% -1.906 NO -1.85% -1.906 NO 
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Table 2.28. 
    tCARi SIGN? Robustness   tCARi SIGN? 
CARi (-1, +1) -8.15% -6.163 YES CARi (-3, -1) 1.30% 0.762 NO 
CARi (-2, +2) -5.35% -3.131 YES CARi (-5, -1) 6.07% 3.551 YES 
CARi (-3, +3) -3.35% -1.659 NO CARi (-10, -1) 3.89% 2.280 YES 
28. United Kingdom 
T Date ARi tARi SIGN? CARi tCARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.14% 0.182 NO -2.41% -0.689 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.38% 0.497 NO -2.55% -0.747 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -1.33% -1.740 NO -2.93% -0.881 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -0.31% -0.409 NO -1.60% -0.495 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.82% -1.069 NO -1.29% -0.410 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.77% 1.009 NO -0.47% -0.155 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.49% -0.635 NO -1.24% -0.421 NO 
3 6/29/2016 2.05% 2.686 YES -0.76% -0.266 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.88% 2.461 YES -2.81% -1.021 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -4.03% -5.270 YES -4.69% -1.773 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -4.56% -5.970 YES -0.67% -0.263 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.43% 0.566 NO 3.89% 1.612 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.93% 1.212 NO 3.46% 1.511 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.06% -0.074 NO 2.54% 1.174 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 3.48% 4.549 YES 2.59% 1.283 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 1.29% 1.686 NO -0.88% -0.472 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 0.27% 0.355 NO -2.17% -1.271 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.36% 0.474 NO -2.44% -1.598 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.35% -1.770 NO -2.80% -2.118 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.32% -0.417 NO -1.45% -1.343 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.13% -1.482 NO -1.13% -1.482 NO 
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9.3 CROSS SECTIONAL (EU FOCUSED) 
Table 3.1. 
    tCAARi SIGN? Robustness   tCAARi SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -4.39% -2.640 YES CAARi (-3, -1) 0.86% 0.402 NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -2.82% -1.312 NO CAARi (-5, -1) 2.80% 1.303 NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -2.69% -1.059 NO CAARi (-10, -1) -0.28% -0.128 NO 
European Union 
T Date AARi tAARi SIGN? CAARi tCAARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.20% 0.209 NO -4.17% -0.947 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.27% 0.277 NO -4.37% -1.017 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -0.44% -0.459 NO -4.63% -1.107 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -0.66% -0.684 NO -4.19% -1.029 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.29% -0.304 NO -3.54% -0.893 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.69% 0.717 NO -3.24% -0.845 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.10% -0.109 NO -3.93% -1.058 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.24% 0.250 NO -3.83% -1.066 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.05% 1.098 NO -4.07% -1.175 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -2.26% -2.353 YES -5.12% -1.540 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -2.59% -2.696 YES -2.86% -0.899 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.46% 0.477 NO -0.28% -0.091 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.52% 0.540 NO -0.73% -0.255 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.11% -0.119 NO -1.25% -0.461 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.88% 0.918 NO -1.14% -0.448 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 1.05% 1.097 NO -2.02% -0.859 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.92% -0.953 NO -3.07% -1.431 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.42% 0.437 NO -2.16% -1.123 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -0.94% -0.979 NO -2.58% -1.549 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.55% -0.577 NO -1.64% -1.205 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.08% -1.127 NO -1.08% -1.127 NO 
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Table 3.2. 
    tCAARi SIGN? Robustness   tCAARi SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -4.25% -2.538 YES CAARi (-3, -1) 0.85% 0.392 NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -2.72% -1.259 NO CAARi (-5, -1) 2.68% 1.238 NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -2.67% -1.042 NO CAARi (-10, -1) -0.43% -0.199 NO 
EU Less UK 
T Date AARi tAARi SIGN? CAARi tCAARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.20% 0.210 NO -4.23% -0.955 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.26% 0.271 NO -4.43% -1.026 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -0.41% -0.422 NO -4.70% -1.115 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -0.67% -0.692 NO -4.29% -1.046 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.27% -0.282 NO -3.62% -0.908 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.69% 0.709 NO -3.35% -0.866 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.09% -0.094 NO -4.03% -1.077 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.17% 0.179 NO -3.94% -1.090 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.02% 1.059 NO -4.11% -1.181 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -2.19% -2.269 YES -5.14% -1.535 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -2.52% -2.602 YES -2.95% -0.919 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.46% 0.475 NO -0.43% -0.141 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.50% 0.521 NO -0.89% -0.306 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.12% -0.120 NO -1.39% -0.509 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.79% 0.812 NO -1.28% -0.499 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 1.04% 1.081 NO -2.06% -0.871 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.96% -0.992 NO -3.11% -1.437 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.42% 0.436 NO -2.15% -1.111 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -0.93% -0.957 NO -2.57% -1.534 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.56% -0.582 NO -1.64% -1.202 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.08% -1.118 NO -1.08% -1.118 NO 
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Table 3.3. 
    tCAARi SIGN? Robustness   tCAARi SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -4.80% -2.789 YES CAARi (-3, -1) 0.86% 0.387 NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -3.45% -1.553 NO CAARi (-5, -1) 2.88% 1.295 NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -3.27% -1.245 NO CAARi (-10, -1) -0.44% -0.198 NO 
Eurozone 
T Date AARi tAARi SIGN? CAARi tCAARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.42% 0.427 NO -4.95% -1.087 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.11% 0.108 NO -5.37% -1.209 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -0.46% -0.465 NO -5.48% -1.265 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -0.95% -0.952 NO -5.01% -1.190 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.23% -0.229 NO -4.07% -0.994 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.87% 0.874 NO -3.84% -0.967 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.14% -0.142 NO -4.71% -1.225 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.31% 0.311 NO -4.57% -1.230 NO 
2 6/28/2016 0.97% 0.981 NO -4.88% -1.362 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -2.32% -2.339 YES -5.85% -1.701 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -3.09% -3.111 YES -3.53% -1.072 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.61% 0.619 NO -0.44% -0.140 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.37% 0.377 NO -1.05% -0.354 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.13% -0.131 NO -1.43% -0.509 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.84% 0.846 NO -1.30% -0.494 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 1.18% 1.186 NO -2.14% -0.879 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.95% -0.955 NO -3.32% -1.494 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.19% 0.192 NO -2.37% -1.193 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -0.96% -0.971 NO -2.56% -1.488 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.67% -0.677 NO -1.59% -1.136 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -0.92% -0.929 NO -0.92% -0.929 NO 
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Table 3.4. 
    tCAARi SIGN? Robustness   tCAARi SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -3.53% -2.298 YES CAARi (-3, -1) 0.87% 0.439 NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -1.48% -0.746 NO CAARi (-5, -1) 2.63% 1.327 NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -1.47% -0.625 NO CAARi (-10, -1) 0.07% 0.037 NO 
Non-Eurozone 
T Date AARi tAARi SIGN? CAARi tCAARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 -0.27% -0.306 NO -2.52% -0.621 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.60% 0.678 NO -2.25% -0.568 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -0.40% -0.447 NO -2.85% -0.738 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -0.05% -0.052 NO -2.46% -0.653 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.43% -0.484 NO -2.41% -0.659 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.31% 0.351 NO -1.98% -0.559 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.03% -0.031 NO -2.29% -0.668 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.09% 0.105 NO -2.27% -0.683 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.23% 1.382 NO -2.36% -0.738 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -2.12% -2.396 YES -3.58% -1.167 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -1.53% -1.728 NO -1.46% -0.496 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.13% 0.144 NO 0.07% 0.026 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.82% 0.929 NO -0.05% -0.021 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.08% -0.091 NO -0.88% -0.350 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.97% 1.093 NO -0.80% -0.340 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.79% 0.893 NO -1.77% -0.814 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.85% -0.955 NO -2.56% -1.291 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.90% 1.018 NO -1.71% -0.965 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -0.89% -1.005 NO -2.61% -1.702 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.30% -0.343 NO -1.72% -1.374 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.42% -1.600 NO -1.42% -1.600 NO 
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Table 3.5. 
    tCAARi SIGN? Robustness   tCAARi SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -9.70% -4.238 YES CAARi (-3, -1) 1.59% 0.539 NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -7.48% -2.533 YES CAARi (-5, -1) 5.58% 1.889 NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -7.09% -2.027 YES CAARi (-10, -1) -0.60% -0.204 NO 
PIIGS 
T Date AARi tAARi SIGN? CAARi tCAARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 1.01% 0.766 NO -10.44% -1.724 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.30% 0.226 NO -11.45% -1.938 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -0.69% -0.520 NO -11.75% -2.040 YES 
7 7/5/2016 -1.66% -1.257 NO -11.06% -1.973 YES 
6 7/4/2016 -0.79% -0.598 NO -9.40% -1.725 NO 
5 7/1/2016 1.13% 0.854 NO -8.61% -1.629 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.46% -0.348 NO -9.74% -1.903 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.37% 0.281 NO -9.28% -1.877 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.67% 1.266 NO -9.65% -2.026 YES 
1 6/27/2016 -3.11% -2.351 YES -11.32% -2.474 YES 
0 6/24/2016 -7.62% -5.764 YES -8.22% -1.875 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 1.02% 0.775 NO -0.60% -0.144 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.54% 0.409 NO -1.63% -0.411 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 0.03% 0.021 NO -2.17% -0.580 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 1.38% 1.041 NO -2.19% -0.628 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 2.61% 1.977 YES -3.57% -1.103 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -1.34% -1.015 NO -6.18% -2.093 YES 
-7 6/15/2016 -0.15% -0.111 NO -4.84% -1.832 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.19% -0.902 NO -4.69% -2.052 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 -1.49% -1.124 NO -3.50% -1.875 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -2.02% -1.527 NO -2.02% -1.527 NO 
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Table 3.6. 
    tCAARi SIGN? Robustness   tCAARi SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -3.24% -2.168 YES CAARi (-3, -1) 0.70% 0.366 NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -1.80% -0.935 NO CAARi (-5, -1) 2.19% 1.138 NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -1.73% -0.761 NO CAARi (-10, -1) -0.20% -0.106 NO 
European Union Less PIIGS 
T Date AARi tAARi SIGN? CAARi tCAARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.02% 0.028 NO -2.80% -0.710 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.26% 0.300 NO -2.83% -0.734 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -0.39% -0.449 NO -3.09% -0.822 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -0.44% -0.508 NO -2.70% -0.738 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.18% -0.213 NO -2.26% -0.636 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.59% 0.688 NO -2.08% -0.603 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.03% -0.032 NO -2.67% -0.800 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.21% 0.245 NO -2.64% -0.820 NO 
2 6/28/2016 0.92% 1.068 NO -2.85% -0.919 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -2.07% -2.407 YES -3.77% -1.264 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -1.50% -1.736 NO -1.70% -0.595 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.34% 0.389 NO -0.20% -0.075 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.51% 0.597 NO -0.54% -0.208 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.14% -0.168 NO -1.05% -0.432 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.77% 0.898 NO -0.91% -0.398 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.71% 0.829 NO -1.68% -0.797 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.82% -0.955 NO -2.40% -1.244 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.54% 0.629 NO -1.57% -0.913 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -0.89% -1.028 NO -2.12% -1.418 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.35% -0.408 NO -1.23% -1.009 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -0.88% -1.020 NO -0.88% -1.020 NO 
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9.4 CROSS SECTIONAL (SMALLER UNIONS FOCUSED) 
Table 4.1. 
    tCAARi SIGN? Robustness   tCAARi SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -4.74% -2.927 YES CAARi (-3, -1) 1.12% 0.535 NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -3.55% -1.701 NO CAARi (-5, -1) 3.50% 1.676 NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -3.32% -1.342 NO CAARi (-10, -1) 0.81% 0.388 NO 
BENELUX 
T Date AARi tAARi SIGN? CAARi tCAARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.32% 0.347 NO -3.65% -0.853 NO 
9 7/7/2016 -0.27% -0.287 NO -3.97% -0.952 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -0.99% -1.063 NO -3.71% -0.910 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -1.17% -1.253 NO -2.71% -0.685 NO 
6 7/4/2016 0.32% 0.345 NO -1.54% -0.401 NO 
5 7/1/2016 1.77% 1.895 NO -1.87% -0.500 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.01% -0.013 NO -3.64% -1.005 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.74% 0.793 NO -3.62% -1.037 NO 
2 6/28/2016 0.67% 0.717 NO -4.36% -1.296 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -2.95% -3.159 YES -5.03% -1.556 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -2.89% -3.097 YES -2.08% -0.673 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 1.11% 1.186 NO 0.81% 0.274 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.51% 0.549 NO -0.30% -0.106 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.50% -0.539 NO -0.81% -0.307 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.96% 1.028 NO -0.31% -0.124 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 1.42% 1.523 NO -1.27% -0.554 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.38% -0.406 NO -2.69% -1.288 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.50% 0.538 NO -2.31% -1.237 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.42% -1.521 NO -2.81% -1.739 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.44% -0.476 NO -1.39% -1.055 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -0.95% -1.016 NO -0.95% -1.016 NO 
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Table 4.2. 
    tCAARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
    
CAARi (-1, +1) -1.31% -0.910 NO CAARi (-3, -1) -0.53% -0.285 NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -1.06% -0.573 NO CAARi (-5, -1) -0.81% -0.437 NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -0.58% -0.262 NO CAARi (-10, -1) -2.52% -1.360 NO 
BALTIC 
T Date AARi tAARi SIGN? CAARi tCAARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.08% 0.093 NO -1.45% -0.382 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.28% 0.334 NO -1.53% -0.412 NO 
8 7/6/2016 0.43% 0.522 NO -1.80% -0.499 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -0.34% -0.412 NO -2.24% -0.636 NO 
6 7/4/2016 0.63% 0.762 NO -1.90% -0.555 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.09% 0.107 NO -2.53% -0.762 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.05% -0.058 NO -2.62% -0.815 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.59% 0.706 NO -2.57% -0.828 NO 
2 6/28/2016 0.48% 0.581 NO -3.15% -1.055 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -1.55% -1.867 NO -3.64% -1.266 NO 
0 6/24/2016 0.43% 0.523 NO -2.09% -0.759 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 -0.19% -0.233 NO -2.52% -0.962 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 -0.24% -0.285 NO -2.33% -0.936 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.10% -0.120 NO -2.09% -0.892 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 -0.32% -0.386 NO -1.99% -0.908 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.04% 0.046 NO -1.67% -0.823 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -1.35% -1.634 NO -1.71% -0.923 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 -0.43% -0.516 NO -0.36% -0.215 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 0.16% 0.190 NO 0.07% 0.050 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 0.20% 0.236 NO -0.09% -0.073 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -0.28% -0.339 NO -0.28% -0.339 NO 
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Table 4.3. 
    tCAARi SIGN? Robustness   tCAARi SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -3.43% -2.101 YES CAARi (-3, -1) 0.71% 0.336 NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -1.28% -0.607 NO CAARi (-5, -1) 2.76% 1.310 NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -0.72% -0.288 NO CAARi (-10, -1) -1.24% -0.590 NO 
NORDIC 
T Date AARi tAARi SIGN? CAARi tCAARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.35% 0.374 NO -3.12% -0.721 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.70% 0.745 NO -3.47% -0.823 NO 
8 7/6/2016 -0.87% -0.927 NO -4.17% -1.015 NO 
7 7/5/2016 -1.45% -1.539 NO -3.30% -0.824 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.71% -0.755 NO -1.85% -0.475 NO 
5 7/1/2016 1.47% 1.556 NO -1.13% -0.301 NO 
4 6/30/2016 0.07% 0.074 NO -2.60% -0.712 NO 
3 6/29/2016 0.78% 0.827 NO -2.67% -0.757 NO 
2 6/28/2016 1.23% 1.309 NO -3.45% -1.015 NO 
1 6/27/2016 -6.00% -6.364 YES -4.69% -1.434 NO 
0 6/24/2016 2.56% 2.714 YES 1.32% 0.421 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.01% 0.010 NO -1.24% -0.417 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.92% 0.975 NO -1.25% -0.443 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.22% -0.233 NO -2.17% -0.814 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 1.49% 1.576 NO -1.95% -0.782 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.57% 0.601 NO -3.44% -1.489 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -1.66% -1.756 NO -4.01% -1.900 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.92% 0.971 NO -2.35% -1.246 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.86% -1.968 YES -3.27% -1.999 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 0.07% 0.075 NO -1.41% -1.056 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.48% -1.569 NO -1.48% -1.569 NO 
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Table 4.4. 
    tCAARi SIGN? Robustness 
 
tCAARi SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -11.10% -7.863 YES CAARi (-3, -1) 0.93% 0.512 NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -8.41% -4.615 YES CAARi (-5, -1) 5.59% 3.066 YES 
CAARi (-3, +3) -7.28% -3.376 YES CAARi (-10, -1) 1.84% 1.009 NO 
BRITISH ISLES 
T Date AARi tAARi SIGN? CAARi tCAARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 0.37% 0.453 NO -8.07% -2.160 YES 
9 7/7/2016 0.59% 0.720 NO -8.44% -2.315 YES 
8 7/6/2016 -1.31% -1.606 NO -9.03% -2.540 YES 
7 7/5/2016 -1.28% -1.565 NO -7.72% -2.231 YES 
6 7/4/2016 -1.12% -1.377 NO -6.44% -1.916 NO 
5 7/1/2016 1.34% 1.649 NO -5.32% -1.631 NO 
4 6/30/2016 -0.29% -0.352 NO -6.66% -2.110 YES 
3 6/29/2016 1.55% 1.899 NO -6.38% -2.090 YES 
2 6/28/2016 1.79% 2.202 YES -7.92% -2.696 YES 
1 6/27/2016 -6.74% -8.274 YES -9.72% -3.441 YES 
0 6/24/2016 -4.81% -5.904 YES -2.97% -1.100 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 0.46% 0.559 NO 1.84% 0.713 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.89% 1.097 NO 1.38% 0.566 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.42% -0.511 NO 0.49% 0.212 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 3.37% 4.139 YES 0.91% 0.420 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 1.28% 1.572 NO -2.47% -1.236 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.70% -0.856 NO -3.75% -2.057 YES 
-7 6/15/2016 0.28% 0.342 NO -3.05% -1.872 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -1.38% -1.694 NO -3.33% -2.359 YES 
-9 6/13/2016 -0.77% -0.943 NO -1.95% -1.691 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -1.18% -1.448 NO -1.18% -1.448 NO 
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Table 4.5. 
    tCAARi SIGN? Robustness   tCAARi SIGN? 
CAARi (-1, +1) -1.36% -1.159 NO CAARi (-3, -1) 0.41% 0.273 NO 
CAARi (-2, +2) -0.06% -0.041 NO CAARi (-5, -1) 0.55% 0.365 NO 
CAARi (-3, +3) -0.45% -0.249 NO CAARi (-10, -1) 0.61% 0.405 NO 
BALKANS 
T Date AARi tAARi SIGN? CAARi tCAARi SIGN? 
10 7/8/2016 -0.28% -0.421 NO 1.16% 0.375 NO 
9 7/7/2016 0.35% 0.519 NO 1.45% 0.478 NO 
8 7/6/2016 0.21% 0.315 NO 1.09% 0.372 NO 
7 7/5/2016 0.90% 1.335 NO 0.88% 0.308 NO 
6 7/4/2016 -0.10% -0.149 NO -0.02% -0.007 NO 
5 7/1/2016 0.28% 0.409 NO 0.08% 0.030 NO 
4 6/30/2016 0.05% 0.076 NO -0.20% -0.075 NO 
3 6/29/2016 -0.30% -0.438 NO -0.25% -0.098 NO 
2 6/28/2016 0.77% 1.134 NO 0.05% 0.020 NO 
1 6/27/2016 0.03% 0.037 NO -0.72% -0.306 NO 
0 6/24/2016 -1.35% -2.004 YES -0.74% -0.331 NO 
-1 6/23/2016 -0.03% -0.041 NO 0.61% 0.286 NO 
-2 6/22/2016 0.53% 0.781 NO 0.64% 0.315 NO 
-3 6/21/2016 -0.09% -0.129 NO 0.11% 0.058 NO 
-4 6/20/2016 0.10% 0.152 NO 0.20% 0.111 NO 
-5 6/17/2016 0.04% 0.054 NO 0.10% 0.058 NO 
-6 6/16/2016 -0.27% -0.402 NO 0.06% 0.039 NO 
-7 6/15/2016 0.71% 1.052 NO 0.33% 0.245 NO 
-8 6/14/2016 -0.18% -0.269 NO -0.38% -0.324 NO 
-9 6/13/2016 0.31% 0.459 NO -0.20% -0.207 NO 
-10 6/10/2016 -0.51% -0.752 NO -0.51% -0.752 NO 
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9.5 METRIC EXPLANATION SPECIFICATIONS TESTS 
 
Model Metric Explanation: OLS, using observations 1-27 
Dependent variable: CAR (-1, +1) 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Const. 0.0248651 0.0105073 2.366 0.0268 ** 
Debt/GDP −0.0340382 0.0117764 −2.890 0.0083 *** 
Openness −0.485372 0.134661 −3.604 0.0015 *** 
CARi (-5, +1) −0.682741 0.193747 −3.524 0.0018 *** 
 
Mean dependent var. −0.042498  S.D. dependent var.  0.036504 
Sum squared residuals  0.008377  S.E. of regression  0.019084 
R-squared  0.758214  Adjusted R-squared  0.726677 
F(3, 23)  24.04180  P-value(F)  2.83e-07 
Log-likelihood  70.74313  Akaike criterion −133.4863 
Schwarz criterion −128.3029  Hannan-Quinn −131.9450 
 
 
t (23, 0.025) = 2.069 
 
 Variable Coefficient 95% confidence interval 
Const. 0.0248651 (0.00312901, 0.0466011)   
Debt/GDP -0.0340382 (-0.0583995, -0.00967694)   
Openness -0.485372 (-0.763941, -0.206804)   
CARi (-5, +1) -0.682741 (-1.08354, -0.281946)   
Restriction sets: 
 1: b [Debt/GDP] = 0 
 2: b [Openness] = 0 
 3: b [CARi (-5, +1)] = 0 
 
Test statistic: F (3, 23) = 24.0418, with p-value = 2.82727e-007 
 
Restricted estimates: 
 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
  Const.      −0.0424975    0.00702520   −6.049     2.17e-06 *** 
  Debt/GDP     0.000000     0.000000     NA               NA        
  Openness     0.000000     0.000000     NA               NA        
  CARi51      0.000000     0.000000        NA                NA        
 
  Standard error of the regression = 0.036504 
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Summary Statistics, using the observations 1 - 27 
for the variable uhat1 (27 valid observations) 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
1.1179e-017 -0.0036478 -0.026918 0.036580 
 Std. Dev. C.V. Skewness Ex. kurtosis 
0.017950 undefined 0.37371 -0.85813 
 5% Perc. 95% Perc. IQ range Missing obs. 
-0.026145 0.035612 0.030692 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test for normality of uhat1: 
 
 Doornik-Hansen test = 2.15974, with p-value 0.339639 
 
 Shapiro-Wilk W = 0.957251, with p-value 0.319369 
 
 Lilliefors test = 0.0990377, with p-value ~= 0.7 
 
 Jarque-Bera test = 1.45692, with p-value 0.482652 
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Auxiliary regression for RESET specification test 
OLS, using observations 1-27 
Dependent variable: CAR11 
 
                                      coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Const.                 −0.00188779    0.0281816   −0.06699   0.9472  
  Debt/GDP          −0.0143687     0.0304249   −0.4723    0.6416  
  Openness           −0.146408      0.378187    −0.3871    0.7026  
  CARi (-5, +1)       −0.510966      0.538410    −0.9490    0.3534  
  yhat^2                    0.544815     16.9230       0.03219   0.9746  
  yhat^3                     48.0446       97.8931       0.4908    0.6287  
 
Test statistic: F = 3.354355, 
with p-value = P (F (2,21) > 3.35436) = 0.0544 
 
Augmented regression for Chow test 
OLS, using observations 1-27 
Dependent variable: CAR11 
 
                              coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value 
                         ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Const.                        0.00269672   0.0149225     0.1807    0.8585 
Debt/GDP               −0.0345263    0.0144124    −2.396     0.0271  ** 
Openness                  0.0909822    0.265532      0.3426    0.7356 
CARi (-5, +1)            −0.905977     0.232045     −3.904     0.0010  *** 
splitdum                    0.0315604    0.0195847     1.611     0.1236 
sd_Debt/GDP           0.00142810   0.0220614     0.06473   0.9491 
sd_Openness          −0.817674     0.303301     −2.696     0.0143  ** 
sd_CARi(-5, +1)         0.487521     0.352037      1.385     0.1821 
 
Mean dependent var.     −0.042498           S.D. dependent var.      0.036504 
Sum squared residuals      0.005518          S.E. of regression          0.017042 
R-squared                           0.840727           Adjusted R-squared      0.782048 
F (7, 19)                              14.32748            P-value(F)                       2.27e-06 
Log-likelihood                    76.37853            Akaike criterion            −136.7571 
Schwarz criterion            −126.3904             Hannan-Quinn             −133.6745 
 
Chow test for structural break at observation 14 
  F (4, 19) = 2.46081 with p-value 0.0804 
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White's test for heteroskedasticity 
OLS, using observations 1-27 
Dependent variable: uhat^2 
 
                              coefficient    std. error    t-ratio   p-value 
                               ----------------------------------------------------------- 
Const.                    0.000103747   0.000905443    0.1146   0.9101 
Debt/GDP             0.000339473   0.00169241     0.2006   0.8434 
Openness             0.00310713    0.0168971      0.1839   0.8563 
CARi (-5, +1)         0.0110075     0.0167088      0.6588   0.5189 
sq_Debt/GDP     −0.000349049   0.000926800   −0.3766   0.7111 
X2_X3                   −0.00536326    0.0173467     −0.3092   0.7609 
X2_X4                    0.00598116    0.0151117      0.3958   0.6972 
sq_Openness       0.0465027     0.0790760      0.5881   0.5642 
X3_X4                  −0.185081      0.313300      −0.5907   0.5625 
sq_CARi51           −0.0526905     0.182512      −0.2887   0.7763 
 
Unadjusted R-squared = 0.145390 
 
Test statistic: TR^2 = 3.925532, 
with p-value = P (Chi-square (9) > 3.925532) = 0.916245 
Model 2: OLS, using observations 1-27 
Dependent variable: CAR (-1, +1) 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Const. 0.0248651 0.0110323 2.254 0.0340 ** 
Debt/GDP −0.0340382 0.0111040 −3.065 0.0055 *** 
Openness −0.485372 0.147905 −3.282 0.0033 *** 
CARi51 −0.682741 0.171569 −3.979 0.0006 *** 
 
Mean dependent var. −0.042498  S.D. dependent var.  0.036504 
Sum squared residuals  0.008377  S.E. of regression  0.019084 
R-squared  0.758214  Adjusted R-squared  0.726677 
F (3, 23)  25.20603  P-value(F)  1.88e-07 
Log-likelihood  70.74313  Akaike criterion −133.4863 
Schwarz criterion −128.3029  Hannan-Quinn −131.9450 
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9.5.1 Overall Results of the Tests: 
9.5.1.1 RESET test for specification - 
  Null hypothesis: specification is adequate 
  Test statistic: F (2, 21) = 3.35436 
  with p-value = P (F (2, 21) > 3.35436) = 0.0544291 
 
9.5.1.2 Chow test for structural break at observation 14 - 
  Null hypothesis: no structural break 
  Test statistic: F (4, 19) = 2.46081 
  with p-value = P (F (4, 19) > 2.46081) = 0.0804108 
 
9.5.1.3 White's test for heteroskedasticity - 
  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
  Test statistic: LM = 3.92553 
  with p-value = P (Chi-square (9) > 3.92553) = 0.916245 
 
